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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 
 
 
China’s Internet filtering regime is the most sophisticated effort of its kind in the world.  
Compared to similar efforts in other states, China’s filtering regime is pervasive, sophisticated, and 
effective.  It comprises multiple levels of legal regulation and technical control.  It involves numerous state 
agencies and thousands of public and private personnel.  It censors content transmitted through multiple 
methods, including Web pages, Web logs, on-line discussion forums, university bulletin board systems, 
and e-mail messages.  Our testing found efforts to prevent access to a wide range of sensitive materials, 
from pornography to religious material to political dissent.  ONI sought to determine the degree to which 
China filters sites on topics that the Chinese government finds sensitive, and found that the state does so 
extensively.  Chinese citizens seeking access to Web sites containing content related to Taiwanese and 
Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Dalai Lama, the Tiananmen Square incident, opposition political 
parties, or a variety of anti-Communist movements will frequently find themselves blocked.  Despite 
conventional wisdom, though, ONI found that most major American media sites, such as CNN, MSNBC, 
and ABC, are generally available in China (though the BBC remains blocked).  Moreover, most sites we 
tested in our global list’s human rights and anonymizer categories are accessible as well.  While it is 
difficult to describe this widespread filtering with precision, our research documents a system that 
imposes strong controls on its citizens’ ability to view and to publish Internet content.   
Unlike the filtering systems in many other countries, China’s filtering regime appears to be 
carried out at various control points and also to be dynamic, changing along a variety of axes over time.  
This combination of factors leads to a great deal of supposition as to how and why China filters the 
Internet.  These complexities also make it very difficult to render a clear and accurate picture of Internet 
filtering in China at any given moment.  Filtering takes place primarily at the backbone level of China’s 
network, though individual Internet service providers also implement their own blocking.  Our research 
confirmed claims that major Chinese search engines filter content by keyword and remove certain search 
results from their lists.  Similarly, major Chinese Web log (“blog”) service providers either prevent posts 
with certain keywords or edit the posts to remove them.  We found also that some keyword searches were 
blocked by China’s gateway filtering and not the search engines themselves.  Cybercafés, which provide an 
important source of access to the Internet for many Chinese, are required by law to track Internet usage 
by customers and to keep correlated information on file for 60 days.  As a further indication of the 
complexity of China’s filtering regime, we found several instances where particular URLs were blocked 
                       
1 The OpenNet Initiative is a collaborative partnership between three leading academic institutions: the Citizen Lab at 
the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard 
Law School, and the Advanced Network Research Group at the Cambridge Security Programme (Centre for 
International Studies) at the University of Cambridge.  As with all OpenNet Initiative work, these reports represent a 
large team effort. The work of principal investigators Jonathan L. Zittrain and John G. Palfrey, Jr. on this research 
report was made possible by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Research and 
Writing Grants Program of the Program on Global Security and Sustainability.  ONI thanks Che Dong, Alana 
Maurushat, Rebecca Vaughn, and a number of anonymous volunteers for contributing key research to this study. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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but the top-level domain of these URLs was accessible, despite the fact that the source of content 
appeared consistent across the domain – suggesting that filtering may be conducted at a finer level in 
China than in the other countries that we have studied closely.  Moreover, China’s Internet filtering 
appears to have grown more refined, sophisticated, and targeted during the years of ONI’s testing. 
China’s intricate technical filtering regime is buttressed by an equally complex series of laws and 
regulations that control the access to and publication of material online.  While no single statute 
specifically describes the manner in which the state will carry out its filtering regime, a broad range of 
laws – including media regulation, protections of “state secrets,” controls on Internet service providers 
and Internet content providers, laws specific to cybercafés, and so forth – provide a patchwork series of 
rationales and, in sum, massive legal support for filtering by the state.  The rights afforded to citizens as 
protection against filtering and surveillance, such as a limited privacy right in the Chinese Constitution, 
that otherwise might provide a counter-balance against state action on filtering and surveillance, are not 
clearly stated and are likely considered by the state to be inapplicable in this context. 
China operates the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of 
Internet filtering in the world.  The implications of this distorted on-line information environment for 
China’s users are profound, and disturbing. 
 
2. POLITICAL, TECHNICAL, AND LEGAL CONTEXT IN CHINA 
 
 
A. Sensitive / Controversial Topics for Media Coverage 
  In China, a wide range of topics are considered sensitive or controversial by the government.  
Media are heavily controlled and journalists are frequently punished for publishing information or stating 
positions that deviate from official Communist Party doctrine.2  Organized dissent and criticism of the 
Communist Party are not tolerated.3  Coverage of any group that can organize large numbers of people is 
considered threatening.  The Falun Gong spiritual movement, in particular, has been targeted for 
repression in recent years.4 
In general, China attempts to suppress publication of information related to “subversive” political 
movements and controversial state actions, including the Tiananmen Square uprising,5 support for a free 
Tibet,6 the Falun Gong spiritual movement,7 criticism of China’s human rights and social justice records,8 
                       
2 He Qinglian, Media Control in China, Nov. 4, 2004, at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/8991. 
3 Qinglian, Media Control in China. 
4 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005: China at 18. 
5 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005: China, January 2005, at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/china9809.htm. 
6 Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Internet Filtering in China, IEEE Internet Computing, March/April 2003, 
available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/ public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN011043.pdf. 
7 Zittrain & Edelman, Internet Filtering in China. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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independent news media,9 and pro-democracy / pro-Western commentary.10  Calls for decreased 
censorship are often themselves censored.11  Journalists who report on unfavorable events or question the 
party line are often jailed on fabricated charges meant to discredit them.12  Additionally, the state actively 
suppresses “inappropriate” material including pornography, sex-related information, and obscenity.13  
Methods of circumventing Internet filters and content restrictions are also censored.14 
While China stopped subsidizing newspapers and magazines in 2003, the state still tightly 
controls the media sector.15  Foreign companies cannot invest in newspapers and must enter into 
partnerships or licensing agreements with Chinese firms to publish magazines.16  While the government 
generally controls what is published, it is stricter in some areas than others.17  Journalists and 
commentators often cannot know the boundaries for prohibited expression, and the risk of losing their 
jobs and facing civil or criminal liability leads to self-censorship.18 
 
B. Internet Infrastructure and Access 
According to the most recent study by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), 
China has 94 million Internet users, nearly half of whom have broadband access.19  Other studies estimate 
130 million users by counting those who do not have a computer in their home but access the Internet 
from cybercafés.20  China has international bandwidth capacity measuring 74,429 megabits per second.  
Almost 60 million unique Internet protocol (IP) addresses have been assigned to computers in China.21 
China’s Internet regulatory policy authorizes four state organizations — now subsumed into the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII) — to operate networks connected to the global Internet.22  The 
                                                                        
8 See, e.g., Reporters Sans Frontières, Reformist Journalists and Intellectuals Punished and Censored, Dec. 3, 2004, 
at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12008. 
9 Zittrain & Edelman, Internet Filtering in China. 
10 China’s influence extends even to broadcasters outside the state.  See, e.g., Reporters Sans Frontières, Chinese-
language NTDTV harassed by Beijing, May 25, 2004, at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10439. 
11 See, e.g., Reporters Sans Frontières, Five Resign From Editorial Board in Solidarity With Dismissed Magazine 
Editor, Dec. 6, 2004, at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11726. 
12 Qinglian, Media Control in China, at 19. 
13 See, e.g. Nation’s Fierce Smut Wars Wages Onward, China Daily, at  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-01/22/content_2494594.htm. 
14 Censorware Project, SafeWeb Privacy Proxy Censored in China, Mar. 14, 2001, at 
http://censorware.net/article.pl?sid=01/03/14/0755209. 
15 Xinhua News Agency, Print Media Reform Involves 2000 Newspapers, 9000 Magazines, China Daily, Nov. 27, 
2003, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/27/content_285360.htm. 
16 BusinessWeek Magazine, Foreign Magazines Facing China’s Newsstand Fever, China Daily, Nov. 5, 2003, at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/05/content_278774.htm. 
17 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2005: China at 29 
18 Qinglian, Media Control in China. 
19 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), 15
th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in 
China, January 2005, at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/download/2005/2005012701.pdf. 
20 Net User Tally in China Nears 134m, South China Morning Post, Feb. 4, 2005, at 
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=20477. 
21 CNNIC, 15
th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China. 
22 Asian Technology Information Program, Report ATIP98.090: The Internet In China, Nov. 3, 1998, at 
http://www.atip.org/public/atip.reports.98/atip98.090r.html. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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MII oversees China’s Internet infrastructure; physical access is provided by nine state-licensed Internet 
access providers (IAPs), each of which has at least one connection to a foreign Internet backbone.23  IAPs 
peer at three Internet exchange points (IXPs) run by the state.24  IAPs grant regional Internet service 
providers (ISPs) access to backbone connections.  Over 620 ISPs were registered in July 2001, and far 
more exist today.25   
 
Figure 1 - Internet Access Providers26 
 
Company Name  Audience  Network Name  Bandwidth 
(Mb/s) 
China Telecom  General public  CHINANET  46268 
China Netcom/CNCNet  Broadband 
users 
CHINA169 19087 
China Science and Technology Network Researchers  CSTNET  5275 
China Unicom  Businesses  UNINET  1645 
China Mobile    CMNET  1130 
China Education and Research Network  Schools  CERNET  1022 
China Intl. Economic and Trade Net     CIETNET  2 
China Great Wall Communications    CGWNET  Under 
construction 
China Satcom    CSNET  Under 
construction 
 
The MII regulates ownership and operation of telecommunications services; the Ministry refused 
to allow foreign companies to offer Internet access in competition with China’s ISPs until China was 
accepted for entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001.27 
  There has been considerable debate about the complicity of Western corporations in the 
development and maintenance of China's filtering system.  China’s Internet infrastructure includes 
equipment and software from U.S. companies, including Cisco Systems, Nortel Networks, Sun 
Microsystems, and 3COM. 28  Cisco Systems in particular has been integral to China’s Internet 
                       
23 CNNIC, 15
th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China. 
24 CNNIC, 15
th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China. 
25 Human Rights Watch, Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China, at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm. 
26 CNNIC, 15
th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China. 
27 Carolyn Duffy Marsan, China: ISPs Report Major Growth in 2004, Network World Fusion, Dec. 20, 2004, at 
http://www.nwfusion.com/newsletters/isp/2004/1220isp1.html. 
28 Asian Technology Information Program, Report ATIP98.090: The Internet in China   See Greg Watson, China’s 
Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China, at 
http://go.openflows.org/ (2001) (describing how American and European technology was used to build China’s digital 
surveillance network); see also Ethan Gutmann, Losing the New China at 127-172 (2004). Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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development.  The core of China's Internet relies on Cisco technology; Cisco specifically implemented the 
backbone networks for ChinaNet29 and CERNet30, China's nation-wide educational network.  Cisco's 
involvement continues to this day with the company’s role in the development of China's “Next-
Generation Network,” known as CN2.31 
  Activists and human rights organizations have for years charged Cisco and other Western 
corporations with actively assisting China in developing censorship and surveillance systems.32  For 
example, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters Sans Frontières have consistently 
highlighted the issues of corporate responsibility and Internet freedom raised by China’s use of Western 
technologies.  These groups allege that Western corporations have facilitated the construction of China’s 
censorship and surveillance infrastructure, and that they may even be involved in the system’s ongoing 
maintenance and operations.33 
  Companies such as Microsoft and Cisco respond to these charges by suggesting that they simply 
sell the technology to China; thus, they cannot and should not control how their customers use what they 
have bought.34  However, at least one whistleblower has stated that Cisco specifically designed and 
developed a special router/firewall box for China.35  
  In addition, the technologies that Cisco sold to China for backbone routing purposes -- Cisco 
12000 series routers -- have packet filtering capability, allowing the routers to filter bi-directionally at the 
packet level and to implement up to 750,000 different filtering rules.36  These systems are designed to 
combat various Internet attacks, including Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and the spread of worms and 
viruses.  For example, to combat the Code Red worm, Cisco released instructions on how to configure 
their routers’ Access Control Lists to block the spread of the worm.37  These same techniques can be 
applied to block political content.  The particular technique described in Cisco’s Code Red document 
                       
29 Cisco Systems, Cisco Systems to be Key Supplier for Building China's Nation-Wide IP Backbone, Oct. 14, 1998, 
available at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/fspnisapid67e.html. 
30 Cisco Systems, CERNET Strengthens Cooperation with Cisco Systems with Major Upgrade of National Backbone 
Network, Sept. 2, 1998, at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/fspnisapia57d.html. 
31 Cisco Systems, Cisco Selected to Build Backbone and Premium Business Network for China Telecom's IP Next 
Generation Network, Nov. 11, 2004, at http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2004/prod_111104.html. 
32 Greg Walton, China's Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the 
People's Republic of China, available at 
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/goldenShieldEng.html. 
33 See, e.g., Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China: Controls tighten as Internet activism grows, Jan. 28, 
2004, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA170012004; Human Rights Watch, China Tightens Internet 
Controls, Aug. 1, 2001, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/08/china-0801.htm; Reporters Sans Frontières, Internet 
Under Surveillance: China, June 22, 2004, at http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=10749; Rights & Democracy 
(International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development), Human Rights at Risk on the Cyber-
battlefield: The Sale of Security & Surveillance Technology to China, at http://www.dd-
rd.ca//english/commdoc/publications/globalization/surveillancetechChina/briefingpaper.htm. 
34 Laura Rohde, Companies defend against Chinese censorship charge, IDG News Service, Dec. 2, 2002, at 
http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2002/1202china.html. 
35 Ethan Gutmann, Who Lost China's Internet?, The Weekly Standard, Feb. 15, 2002, available at  
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=922. 
36 Cisco Systems, Using Cisco 12000 Series IP Services Engine (ISE) Architecture to Enable the High-Speed 
Provider Edge, Oct. 1, 2001, at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/rt/12000/prodlit/werr_wp.htm. 
37 Cisco Systems, Using Network-Based Application Recognition and ACLs for Blocking the “Code Red” Worm, at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/63/nbar_acl_codered.shtml (last updated Apr. 6, 2005 Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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focuses on blocking incoming and outgoing access to URLs that contain certain keywords in the path. 
However, one of the rules employed to block the Code Red worm, Match protocol http url 
“*root.exe*”, could just as easily be Match protocol http url “*falun*”.38  
  It is unlikely that Cisco would choose not to provide customer support or training for specific 
functionality of their products.   Yet without official denial or confirmation, observers are left to speculate 
about their direct involvement in China’s filtering regime. 
 
C. Legal Background 
 
  China’s legal regulation of the Internet is extraordinarily complex.  The legal regime comprises 
requirements and prohibitions issued by multiple bodies and administrative agencies; our research 
indicates that at least a dozen entities have authority over Internet access and content in some form.39  
These rules frequently overlap and restate prior provisions.  Conforming to these requirements is made 
more difficult by the broad, sweeping definitions that many regulations employ.  Overall, China’s legal 
controls over the Internet have expanded greatly since 2000, indicating increased attention to this 
medium of communication.  Moreover, the number of regulatory bodies with a role in Internet control has 
increased.  This may indicate intra-governmental competition for a voice in shaping a medium viewed as 
vital to China’s economic growth and political stability. 
 
1. General Media Regulation 
A number of regulatory agencies combine to control tightly China’s print and broadcast media.  
The General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) licenses and closely monitors publications, 
including newspapers, periodicals, books, and Web sites.40  GAPP is assisted by the General 
Administration for Customs, which confiscates publications deemed “harmful to the government.”41  
China’s State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television regulates radio, television, satellite, and 
Internet broadcasts42, in conjunction with the Ministry of Information Industry, which retains 
responsibility for control of the telecommunications and software industries and Internet content 
provider licensing. The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for general regulation of Internet 
                       
38 Cisco Systems, Using Network−Based Application Recognition and Access Control Lists for Blocking the "Code 
Red" Worm, available at http://www.ccert.edu.cn/upload/1/35.pdf. 
39 See Appendix 2 for a list of these bodies. 
40 Congressional – Executive Commission on China, Freedom of Expression – Laws and Regulations, at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php#clampdown (translating “Notice Regarding Resolutely 
Clamping Down on Illegal Publishing Activities” of Jan. 25, 1996). 
41 Regulations on Customs' Administration of Printed Materials and Audio/Visual Materials Imported or Exported by 
Individuals Via Carriage or Post, July 10, 1991, translation available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php. 
42 See, e.g., Measures on the Administration of Foreign Satellite Television Channel Reception, Aug. 1, 2004; 
Measures on the Administration of Broadcasting Audio/Visual Programs over the Internet or Other Information 
Networks, Jan. 7, 2003, translations available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php; see 
generally Richard Cullen & Pinky D. W. Choy, The Internet in China, 13 Colum. J. Asian L. 99, 116 (1999). Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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access.43 The State Secrecy Bureau classifies state secrets, which all citizens are required to “safeguard.”44  
Finally, the Central Propaganda Department ensures that Chinese publishers print only material 
consistent with the Communist Party’s ideology; the Department uses directives, screenings, and training 
sessions for publishers and their employees to accomplish this goal.45  
 
2. Internet Access Regulation 
China implements access controls for ISPs, ICPs, Internet subscribers, and cybercafé users.  
Access control has always been part of China’s Internet filtering system: in February 1994, one year before 
the Internet became commercially available to Chinese users, the State Council gave the Minister of Public 
Security overall responsibility for supervision of the Internet.46   
Regulation of Internet access has grown more comprehensive, specific, and extensive recently.  
On March 2, 2000 the State Council promulgated “Interim Procedures on Registration and Filing of 
Online Business Operations”47 which, for the first time, explicitly recognized on-line businesses and 
required them to register and submit information on their personnel for “information checks.”48  In 
September 2000, the “Interim Measures on the Administration of Record and Registration of Profit-
making Websites” formalized registration procedures, instituted annual inspections of on-line businesses, 
and required all such businesses to list their registration number prominently on their Web sites.  In 
addition, the State Council issued Order No. 292, “Measures on Internet Information Services,” on 
September 25, 2000.49  This order reiterated and strengthened provisions contained in previous 
legislation, while establishing increased levels of control and enforcement.  Specifically, Order 292 
attempted to differentiate Web sites that provide information “involving the journalism, publication, 
education, medical care, medicines, and medical equipment and so on” -- both for-profit and non-profit -- 
from other Internet businesses.50  
 
a. ISPs 
ISPs that want to provide service in China must obtain an operating license from MII.51  Access 
providers must record a customer’s account number, phone number, and IP address, and Internet content 
                       
43 See Human Rights Watch, Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China, at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm; see also Congressional – Executive Commission on 
China, China’s Censors, at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/expcensors.php. 
44 State Security Law, Feb. 22, 1993, translation available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php; 
see Congressional – Executive Commission on China, China’s Censors. 
45 Congressional – Executive Commission on China, China’s Censors. 
46 Regulations for the Safety Protection of Computer Information Systems, State Council Order No. 147. 
47 Interim Procedures on Registration and Filing of Online Business Operations, State Council, Mar. 2, 2000. 
48 Interim Procedures on Registration and Filing of Online Business Operations, Article 6; see Clara Liang, Red Light, 
Green Light: Has China Achieved Its Goals Through the 2002 Internet Regulations?, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1417, 
1433 (2001). 
49 Measures on Internet Information Services, State Council Order No. 292, Sept. 25, 2000, translation from 
iSinoLaw.com. 
50 Measures on Internet Information Services, Article 5. 
51 China Online, Ministry Profile: Ministry of Information Industry (MII), archived at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20031211153108/http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/ministry_profiles/MIIL3.asp. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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providers that publish, operate bulletin boards, or engage in journalism must keep copies of all content 
made available.52  ISPs are legally responsible for content they display.53  ISPs that fail to follow the law 
face revocation of their business license and arrest of company staff.54 
 
 b.  ICPs 
Internet content providers must control both access to and use of on-line bulletin board services.  
State Council Order No. 292 required for-profit Internet content providers (ICPs) to apply for a special 
business license55 and non-profit ICPs to file official records56.  In addition, any ICP seeking to operate a 
bulletin board system (BBS) would also need to apply for a special license.57  The “Provisions on the 
Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services,” promulgated on October 27, 2000, by the 
State Council, built upon the licensing requirements established by Order No. 292.58  ICPs seeking to 
operate bulletin boards or other electronic communication services were required to obtain approval from 
the Ministry of Information Industry (MII).59  To offer these services, ICPs had to create a comprehensive 
set of rules governing subscriber use of the service, consistent with applicable laws.60  The ICP must 
publish these rules prominently on its Web site.61  Additionally, the Provisions mandated that ICPs set up 
a secure registration and login system to allow the service to identify and track subscribers.62  ICPs were 
required to track subscribers’ usage for 60 days, and to turn over such information to government 
agencies on request.63  Finally, ICPs were charged with monitoring all content on their services and 
immediately removing and reporting any inappropriate or illegal postings.64 
 
c. Subscribers 
A 1996 decree requires all subscribers to register with their local police bureau within the first 30 
days of signing up with an ISP.65  The same decree set up police computer investigation organizations to 
                       
52 Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services, Sept. 25, 2000, translation available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php. 
53 Human Rights Watch, Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China (citing Measures For Managing the Internet 
Information Services). 
54 International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Review of China’s Internet Regulations and 
Domestic Legislation, available at 
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/legislationInternetChinaEng.pdf. 
55 Measures on Internet Information Services, Article 7. 
56 Measures on Internet Information Services, Article 8. 
57 Measures on Internet Information Services, Article 9. 
58 Provisions on the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services, State Council, Oct. 27, 2000, 
translation from China Law & Practice. 
59 Provisions on the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services, Article 5. 
60 Provisions on the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services, Article 6. 
61 Provisions on the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services, Article 10. 
62 Provisions on the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services, Article 6. 
63 Provisions on the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services, Article 14. 
64 Provisions on the Administration of Internet Electronic Messaging Services, Article 13. 
65 Regulations on the Administration of Internet Access Service Business Establishments [Internet Cafés], Sept. 29, 
2002, translation available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php; see Human Rights Watch, 
Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China; Hermida, Behind China’s Internet Red Firewall. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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investigate alleged violations.66  Beginning in 2000, China required ISPs to track their users’ account 
numbers, when users are online, and the sites customers visit.67  ISPs must maintain detailed logs on 
subscribers’ Internet usage for 60 days, and can be held responsible if their customers use the ISP’s 
systems to violate laws.68  Because of these laws, ISPs often implement their own monitoring and 
censoring functions, further limiting subscribers’ access to information.69 
 
d. Cybercafés 
While many Chinese citizens, especially in major cities, have home broadband or dial-up Internet 
connections, a substantial number of users continue to visit cybercafés – only some of which are licensed 
– that have become plentiful in recent years.70  China periodically increases its supervision of Internet 
cafés, which are known as “Net bars” or “wangba.”71  In 2001, the State Council conducted a three-month 
investigation into public Internet providers, closing over 8,000 Internet cafés.72  Police installed filtering 
software to block pornography and other “harmful” information at roughly 5,000 cafés in Liaoning 
province alone.73  Government regulation and surveillance of cybercafés increased dramatically following 
a fire in a Beijing cybercafé in 2002; subsequently, the state shut down 150,000 unlicensed cybercafés.74  
China continues to scrutinize and shut down cybercafés.  Between October and December 2004, China 
closed over 12,000 Internet cafés in a wave of increased enforcement, targeting in particular those located 
near primary and middle schools.75  Children under age 16 are banned from cybercafés,76 where customers 
often play violent video games.77 
All cafés are required to install software that blocks Web sites purportedly containing 
pornographic or “subversive” content.78  Cafés must keep detailed logs linking users to the pages they 
visited and recording access to any blocked pages; these records are reported to the Public Security 
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69 Human Rights Watch, Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China. 
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71 See “Wangba” Crusade, Red Herring. 
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74 Alfred Hermida, Behind China’s Internet Red Firewall, BBC News Online, Sept. 3, 2002, at 
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Bureau.79  Cafés must obtain and record users’ identities by asking for their identification cards, and must 
keep these records for at least 60 days.80   
We translated a copy of China’s Internet café regulations to analyze the state’s control over this 
form of access.81  The goals of the regulations are to provide good service to users and to promote 
socialism.82  Cafés must follow all applicable laws and must “self police.”83  Regulatory responsibility for 
cafés is divided among several entities.  The cultural departments at the county level and above must 
“examine and endorse” new cafés, and must control existing ones.84  The Public Security Bureau has 
responsibility for the “safety of information.”85  The Department of Commerce registers cafés, issues 
permits, and inspects locations to ensure proper licensing.86  The Department of Telecommunications also 
has a role in café oversight.87  Employees of these regulating agencies may not be involved in operating a 
café.88 
Cafés must obtain permission before commencing service.89  Companies that offer this type of 
service must have adequate capital, fire prevention systems, methods for controlling access to 
information, and appropriate technical and security personnel.90  Cafés cannot be located within 200 
meters of an elementary school, middle school, or residential building.91  The process of obtaining 
approval is complex: cafés must submit information to the Culture Department of the government at the 
county level or above, followed by applying for an “information safety permit” and “fire safety permit” 
from the Public Security Bureau, then application for an “Internet culture business permit document” is 
made to the Culture Department, and finally the applicant applies to the Commerce Department for a 
business registration.92  Changing the café’s location, size, interior, or number of computers requires 
additional permissions.93   
Cafés can only operate during designated hours, and cannot admit minors.94  Users must register 
with their identification cards, and cafés must record this information, along with the computer used and 
                       
79 Human Rights Watch, Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China; “Wangba” Crusade, Red Herring. 
80 Regulations on the Administration of Internet Access Service Business Establishments [Internet Cafés]. 
81 The regulations are available at http://www.zetronic.com.cn/news_details.asp?newsid=10015.  We thank Stian 
Haklev for translation assistance. 
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83 Chapter 1, Internet Service Providers [Internet cafés] Operating Regulations. 
84 Chapter 1, Internet Service Providers [Internet cafés] Operating Regulations. 
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the time of use, maintaining it for 60 days and making it available to the Public Security Bureau and the 
Culture Department.95  Penalties for violations include fines and potential criminal liability.96 
 
  3. Internet Content Regulation 
China maintains extremely strong controls over the material that users are allowed to post and to 
access on the Internet.  These include long, complex, and expensive licensing requirements; mandatory 
registration and inspections; prescribed minimums for available capital and the number of employees; 
and broad restrictions on permissible types of content. 
 
a. Regulation of Internet Users 
China took initial steps to control how its citizens used the Internet in December 1997 when the 
Ministry of Public Security, pursuant to its authority under State Council Order No. 147, issued 
comprehensive regulations governing Internet use.  The Ministry stated its goal was “to strengthen the 
security and the protection of computer information networks and of the Internet, and to preserve the 
social order and social stability”.97  The regulations have three key sections, Articles 4 through 6.   
Article 4 of the regulations proscribes individuals from using the Internet to harm national 
security; disclose state secrets; harm the interests of the State, of society, or of a group; or to take part in 
criminal activities.98 
Article 5 bars using the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit information that incites 
resistance to the Constitution, laws, or administrative regulations; incites overthrow of the government or 
socialist system; incites division of the country or harms national unification; incites hatred or 
discrimination among nationalities or harms their unity; distorts the truth, spreads rumors, or destroys 
social order; promotes feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling, violence, or murder; 
furthers terrorism, incites others to criminal activity, or openly insults or slanders other people; injures 
the reputation of state entities; or promotes other activities that violate the Constitution, laws, or 
administrative regulations.99  
Article 6 bars users from engaging in activities that could harm the security of computer 
information networks.  It specifically forbids using networks or network resources without prior approval; 
changing network functions or adding / deleting information; adding to, deleting from, or altering 
materials stored, processed, or transmitted through the network; deliberately creating or transmitting 
viruses; or otherwise harming the network.100 
Article 20 provides penalties for violations.  It dictates that violators of Articles 5 or 6 will receive 
a warning, have any illegally earned income confiscated, be assessed a fine equal to or less than 5,000 
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renminbi (RMB) (approximately $600 U.S.), and, for serious offenses, have their network access 
terminated for up to six months.101   
  The State Council supplemented these Regulations with telecommunications regulations issued in 
2000.102 
 
  b. Regulation of Content Providers 
 State Council Order No. 292, promulgated in September 2000, established the first formal 
content restrictions for ICPs.  Article 12 dictated that content providers were responsible for ensuring the 
legality of any information disseminated through their services and required ICPs to track and maintain 
records of user activity for 60 days.103 Article 15 specified nine restricted, relatively vague categories of 
information that cannot be produced, copied, published, or disseminated, comprising data 
1.  Which are against the principles prescribed in the Constitution;  
2.  Which endanger the security of the State, divulge the secrets of the State, overthrow the 
government, or damage the unification of the State;  
3.  Which harm the dignity and interests of the State;  
4.  Which instigate hatred, discrimination among the ethnic groups, or destroy the unity of 
nationalities;  
5.  Which break the religious policy of the State, spread evil cults or feudal superstition;  
6.  Which spread rumors, disturb the social order, and damage the social stability;  
7.  Which spread pornography, sex, gambling, violence, murder, terrorism or abetment;  
8.  Which insult or slander others and thus infringe upon others' lawful rights and interests; or  
9.  Which involve other contents prohibited by the laws and administrative rules.104 
ICPs finding content on their services that violated one of the nine provisions were required to make a 
complete report to the relevant authorities105. 
Two years later, on June 27, 2002, the General Administration of Press and Publishing (GAPP) 
teamed with the Ministry of Information Industry to release the “Interim Provisions on the 
Administration of Internet Publication.”  These provisions responded to mandates issued to these 
organizations in the State Council's “Administration of Publishing Regulations” and the “Measures on 
Internet Information Services.” The new provisions sought to reconcile controls over on-line publishing 
with those for print publications, and to unify Internet regulation and supervision efforts across agencies. 
                       
101 Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations, Article 20. 
102 The Telecommunications Regulations ban individuals from using telecommunications networks to make, 
duplicate, issue, or disseminate the following information: (1) opposing constitutional principles; (2) jeopardizing 
national security, revealing state secrets, subverting state power, or undermining national security; (3) harming the 
property and interests of the states; (4) arousing ethnic animosities, ethnic discrimination, or undermining ethnic 
solidarity; (5) undermining state religious policies or promoting cults and feudal superstitions; (6) spreading rumors, 
disturbing social order, or undermining social stability; (7) spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, 
murder, terror, or instigating crime; (8) insulting or slandering others, or violating their legal rights and interests; (9) 
having other content prohibited by laws or administrative regulations.  Telecommunications Regulations, State 
Council Order No. 291, issued Oct. 11, 2000. 
103 Measures on Internet Information Services, Article 12 (translation obtained from iSinoLaw.com). 
104 Measures on Internet Information Services, Article 15. 
105 Measures on Internet Information Services, Article 16. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
  15 
The provisions define “Internet publishing” as “an act of online dissemination whereby information 
service providers select, edit, and process works created by themselves or others and subsequently post 
the same on the internet or transmit the same to the end users via the internet for browsing, reading, use 
or downloading by the public.”106  These “works” include formally published content that has appeared in 
books, newspapers, and periodicals as well as “edited and processed works of literature, art, natural 
science, social science and engineering technology.”107  This definition could apply to the material offered 
by every ICP, including non-business-oriented sites and personal Web sites, although the GAPP has not 
applied the provisions to personal sites.108 
Along with restating previous regulations and adding more licensing and inspection requirements 
for ICPs, these provisions create an additional category of restricted information: content that 
“compromises public morality or refined indigenous culture and traditions.”109  In addition to these 
completely proscribed categories, content involving state secrecy, social stability, or other “serious topics” 
must be reported to GAPP, and copies of such material submitted for official records.110  Finally, 
information “targeted at minors” was prohibited if it served to “induce[] minors to imitate acts that are 
contrary to public morality, illegal or criminal111,” or if the material was “of horrific, cruel, or other such 
nature that is harmful to the physical and psychological health of minors.”112 
In addition to regulating content itself, the provisions required ICPs to implement procedural 
controls.  Thus, ICPs had to create an “editor responsibility system” to review all content and editors were 
mandated to undertake “training, though the provisions do not define either of these requirements 
specifically.113 
China has established rules for Internet broadcasting of audiovisual material as well, in an effort 
to harmonize on-line and off-line regulation of this content.  In January 2003, the State Council passed 
“Measures on the Administration of Broadcasting Audio/Visual Programs over the Internet or Other 
Information Networks.”  The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television was given jurisdiction 
over digital media content.  The Measures require ICPs that broadcast news to obtain a license from the 
State Council Information Office, which required additional operating provisions. 
The Ministry of Culture promulgated its “Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Culture,” consisting mostly of restatements of existing rules and regulations, on May 10, 2003.  The 
Ministry required all ICPs to register with its central or provincial office, in addition to the existing 
multiple registrations mandated by other regulations.114  The Provisions extended previously enacted 
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speech and content restrictions to cover information sent to cellular phones and other wireless devices, as 
well as to forms of content not specifically enumerated in previous legislation, such as video games.115 
 
  c. State Secrets Controls 
The State Secrets Law is a critical and broadly defined part of China’s Internet content control.  
The State Secrets Law defines the term “state secrets” to include confidential information in areas ranging 
from social development, to technology, to international relations, to the national defense and economy.116  
The law lists categories of restricted information, including “national defense,” “secrets concerning 
important policy decisions on state affairs,” “economic and social development,” science and technology 
development, and criminal investigations.117  It also encompasses “secrets of political parties,” restricting 
criticism and debate of public policy positions, and gives state agencies the authority to define additional 
categories.118  The State Secrets Bureau has wide discretion in determining what qualifies as a “state 
secret.”119  China has retroactively declared information a state secret.120  If convicted of providing state 
secrets to overseas individuals or organizations via the Internet, citizens face the death penalty.121  
China’s Constitution requires all citizens to “safeguard” state secrets.122  ICPs have additional 
responsibilities to “conscientiously perform secrecy protection duties and establish sound administration 
systems to strengthen supervision and monitoring.”123  Violations of the State Secrets Law must be 
reported to authorities.124  Penalties for failure to comply with state secrets regulations are serious.  The 
Supreme People’s Court ruled that serious cases of state secrets violations can be punished with up to 10 
years in prison, and violators may face the death penalty for cases of severe harm.125 
 
d. News 
News may be published online only by licensed print publishers.126  Non-licensed Web sites that 
wish to carry news may only publish information already publicly released by other news media.127  These 
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sites must obtain approval from state information offices and from the State Council Information 
Agency.128  To be recognized as an online publisher, organizations must undertake the same licensing, and 
follow the same regulations, required for print publishing, an arduous task.129 
Thus, China seeks to ensure that citizens can access only news from sources under state control.  
For example, during the Severe Acute Respiratory System (SARS) outbreak, official online sources and 
print newspapers disclosed only a few cases of “atypical pneumonia”; they stated that there was no 
epidemic, rumors to the contrary were false, and any illnesses could be attributed to “changes in the 
weather.”130  Many citizens learned about SARS through informal channels of communication, such as 
simple messaging service (SMS) messages over cellular phones, rather than through official news 
sources.131 
 
e. Content Controls for Cybercafés 
Cybercafés operate under additional content regulations.  The operators and patrons of these 
establishments may not access, create, download, or transmit information that is contrary to 
constitutional principles; that harms China’s unity, sovereignty, or territorial integrity; that reveals 
national secrets, damages national security, or harms the state’s reputation; that incites ethnic hatred or 
discrimination; that harms ethnic unity, customs, or traditions; that is contrary to national religious 
policy or that spreads superstition; that spreads rumors or disturbs public order; that spreads obscenity or 
violence; that teaches criminal behavior; that defames others or infringes their legal rights; that harms 
public morality; or that is otherwise unlawful.132   
Furthermore, cybercafé users are prohibited from creating or spreading computer viruses, 
illegally accessing computer systems, or engaging in other unlawful activities.133  The cafés cannot offer 
access to gambling games or sites.134  Owners must install network monitoring equipment; if they detect 
that customers are accessing unlawful material, or engaging in forbidden activities, the café must 
disconnect the user and report them to the local Culture Department.135  Penalties for violations include 
fines and potential criminal liability.136 
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f. Extra-legal Content Controls 
Content control in China occurs through informal as well as formal measures.  Thus, the Internet 
Society of China pressures content and access providers to agree to a “Public Pledge of Self-Regulation 
and Professional Ethics.”137  Companies often accede; Yahoo! agreed to the pledge in 2002, and filters 
content available to users at its Chinese language portal.138  Internet regulation in China is based on the 
philosophy that “one is responsible for what one publishes.”139  Thus, Internet companies in China 
practice a high degree of self-censorship.  These companies frequently prefer to focus on sports and 
entertainment rather than risk being shut down.140  ISPs perform self-censorship, including using 
employees who lead teams of volunteers to monitor and moderate chat rooms and bulletin boards.141  
China can thus filter content through voluntary, informal measures, as well as via formal legal or 
technological means. 
Users act as an additional regulatory mechanism.  Some citizens view Internet regulation as 
necessary, and monitor Web sites, chat rooms, and bulletin boards for inappropriate content, reporting 
violations to the authorities.142 
 
D. User Rights and Protections 
China’s laws and regulations do not generally provide comprehensive rights and protections to 
Internet users.  There is often tension between formal legal rights and those recognized in actual cases.  
For example, consider a right to privacy.  Article 38 of China’s Constitution refers to a fundamental right 
of personal dignity, believed by most Chinese legal scholars to incorporate a right of privacy.143  Article 40 
provides for the freedom and privacy of citizens’ communications, and bars other organizations and 
individuals from infringing on those rights.  The same Article, though, contains restrictions on or permits 
deprivation of a citizen’s privacy or correspondence rights by public authorities to “meet the needs of state 
security” or “investigate criminal offenses” – broad, ambiguous exceptions.  Some of China’s legislation 
alludes to a similar right of privacy.  However, Chinese constitutional jurisprudence does not recognize a 
fundamental right of privacy in action. 
Legislation governing Internet users contains the same dichotomy. Certain regulations partially 
recognize a right to privacy. For example, Internet users’ personal information is protected against 
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unauthorized public disclosure by electronic messaging service providers.144  Users whose personal 
information is disclosed, in violation of this provision, can sue for damages and injunctive relief.145  
Similarly, it is illegal to use computer information systems to steal or disrupt others’ information or 
jeopardize the lawful interests of citizens; violators risk civil penalties.146  
User communications also enjoy protection, at least in theory.  Regulations affirm the freedom 
and privacy of users’ e-mails and ban others from infringing upon their privacy.  Violators who illegally 
intercept, modify, or delete others’ e-mails face criminal liability.147  Even compulsory seizure of e-mails 
and other private telecommunications by the state is limited, according to the laws, to instances where the 
public security authority, public procurator authority, or the national security authority must do so to 
investigate a national security threat or criminal conduct.148  Such seizures are formally governed by 
specific criminal procedure requirements.149  
However, the state possesses the power to regulate Internet content and to demand that ISPs and 
Internet Content Providers (ICPs) turn over personal information of Internet users who violate the laws 
or post prohibited content (a term defined broadly).  Upon official request, an ISP or ICP must provide 
the user’s name, IP address, e-mail address, user name, information on any changes in IP address and 
use, and all data saved by the service provider’s computer when the prohibited content or illegal conduct 
took place, including time, content, originating source, and system logs.150 
Thus, while China ostensibly provides some protection to users in the form of legally guaranteed 
rights, these safeguards rarely function in practice. 
 
3. TESTING METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A. Methods 
  ONI performs technical testing across multiple levels of access at multiple time intervals in a 
number of regions around the world.  The team analyzes results within the contextual framework of the 
target state’s filtering technology, law, and regulations.  To obtain meaningful, accurate results we seek to:  
 
•  generate lists of domain names and URLs that have been or are likely to be blocked, based upon 
background research into relevant social and political issues in China; 
•  enumerate ISPs and national routing topography; 
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•  determine the type, location, and behavior of the filtering technology; 
•  deploy network interrogation and enumeration software at multiple access points; and 
•  conduct a thorough statistical analysis of results. 
 
  Determining which URLs to test is a vital component of our research, as it reveals the filtering 
system’s technical capacity and content areas subject to blocking.  ONI employs three types of lists: 
 
•  a list of “high impact” sites reported to be blocked or likely to be blocked in the state due to their 
content (for example, political opposition); 
•  a “global list” containing a control list of manually categorized Web sites reflecting a range of 
Internet content (for example, news and hacking sites), intended in part to enable comparisons 
across multiple states; and 
•  a multilingual list of significant key words used to generate significantly larger lists through 
search engine queries. 
 
  To explore Internet filtering, we deploy network interrogation devices and applications, which 
perform the censorship enumeration, at various Internet access levels.  These tools download the ONI 
testing lists and check whether specific URLs and domains are accessible from that point on the network.  
Interrogation devices are designed to run inside a state (i.e., behind its firewall) to perform specific, 
sensitive functions with varying degrees of stealth.  Similarly, ONI distributes interrogation applications 
to trusted volunteers who run the software inside the state.  For testing, depending upon a series of local 
factors, ONI obtains network access at multiple levels through a combination of: 
 
•  Proxy servers, 
•  Long distance dial-up, 
•  Distributed applications, and 
•  Dedicated servers. 
 
  During initial testing, we use remote computers located in states that filter.  These remote 
computers are located behind the state’s firewalls yet allow access to clients connecting from the wider 
Internet.  We attempt to access the URL and domain name lists through these computers to reveal what 
content is filtered, and how consistently it is blocked.  The ONI team also tests these lists from control 
locations in non-filtered countries.  The testing system flags all URLs and domains that are accessible 
from the control location, but inaccessible from ones inside the target state, as potentially blocked. 
 
B. Results Analysis 
We carefully analyze the data obtained from testing to document the nature of filtered content, to 
explore the technical capabilities of the target state, and to determine areas that require in-depth study 
during testing from inside the state’s firewall.  In particular, ONI examines the response received over 
HTTP when attempting to access filtered content.  In many countries, when content is filtered, users 
generally receive a “block page” – a Web page with text indicating that the requested content cannot be 
accessed. In China, however, filtering can be less obvious or transparent, appearing to be network errors, 
redirections, or lengthy timeouts rather than deliberate blocking.  We analyze HTTP headers – text sent 
from the Web server to the browser – to derive information about both the server and the requested page.  Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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This information is generally hidden from the end user.  However, these headers can indicate whether 
content was successfully accessed or was inaccessible.  If an error occurs, the HTTP protocol returns codes 
that indicate the type of error in the header.  Thus, by analyzing the headers captured during testing, we 
seek to distinguish between errors caused by Internet filtering and more mundane, unintentional network 
connection errors. 
  We classify results in one of four categories: 
 
•  URL was accessible both through the local connection and the remote computer (not filtered); 
•  URL was accessible through the local connection but inaccessible through the remote computer, 
which returned a different HTTP response code (possibly filtered); 
•  URL was accessible through the local connection but inaccessible through the remote computer 
due to a network connection error (possibly filtered, but not definitive); or 
•  URL was accessible through the local connection but inaccessible through the remote computer; 
the remote computer returned a block page (filtered). 
 
  If a URL is inaccessible through both the local connection and the remote computer, we consider 
it “dead” and remove it from the results.  This result indicates that the URL’s content was not available to 
Internet users generally at the time of our testing, making the URL irrelevant for our testing. 
  The ONI team analyzes blocked, unblocked, and uncertain URLs both at an aggregate level (to 
estimate the overall level of filtering) and at a category level (to indicate what types of content the state 
seeks to control).  We publish state-specific studies, such as this one on China, that provide background 
on a state’s political and legal system, lists of tested sites, and analysis of results to reveal and analyze, to 
the greatest extent we can given the data we are able to collect, what information a state blocks and how it 
does so.  We note, however, that our results and analysis capture a “snapshot” of a state’s filtering system 
for a specific point or period of time; governments can and do alter the content they block dynamically. 
 
C. Methods Specific to China 
We tested China’s Internet filtering through four methods.  First, we were able to deploy an 
internally developed application within China to test what content was, and was not, blocked by the state’s 
system.  Volunteers used this application, along with manual checking of Web sites, to probe China’s 
filtering from a number of access points inside the country.  Second, we accessed proxy servers in China to 
duplicate and augment this in-state testing.  Third, we created content on Web logs (“blogs”) on three of 
China’s most popular blog providers to evaluate the services’ keyword filtering mechanisms.  Finally, we 
sent a series of test e-mail messages to, and from, accounts hosted by several Chinese ISPs. 
China’s sophisticated filtering system makes testing its blocking difficult.  For most states in 
which we test, an attempt to access a filtered site returns a block page indicating the requested site is 
prohibited and, occasionally, offering general reasons for this ban and an opportunity to request 
reconsideration of the decision to block access to the given site.  In China, however, a request for a filtered 
Web page returns a network timeout; testing from a remote location via a proxy server in China generally 
returns any one of a series of HTTP error codes.151  In some cases, this included an error indicating the 
                       
151 See generally R. Fielding et al., HTTP/1.1: Status Code Definitions, available at 
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requested page did not exist (known as a “404 error”), 152 even though we could successfully, and 
simultaneously, access the page from outside China.  Furthermore, our testing of “control” sites known to 
be accessible in China (for instance, Web sites of state agencies) through proxy servers returned errors for 
approximately 20% of our requests.  In our proxy testing analysis, we evaluate any site that we could 
access from outside China, but not from inside China in the majority of our tests, as blocked.  We also 
attempted to identify overblocking, where China’s filtering prevented access to pages with unrelated 
content at domain names and URLs similar to those of sites identified by news reports and previous 
testing as containing sensitive content. 
Moreover, China’s filtering system presents a risk of “false positive” results during testing.  When 
a user attempts to access a blocked site, the filtering system resets the user’s connection to that site using 
a TCP RST packet; subsequently, the system advertises a TCP window size of zero for that Web server.  
The user is unable to connect to that server’s IP address until the system advertises a window size greater 
than zero.  Our in-state testing included an instance of this condition: a domain that had been accessible 
prior to the testing of a URL (www.poets4peace.com/peacehall.htm) containing a potentially targeted 
string was blocked after a request for a URL on that site with a prohibited keyword.  Even though 
subsequent URL requests were for unrelated content, the disruption caused by the zero window size 
condition persisted and prevented the tester from reaching those pages. 
We conducted testing in several stages, and analyze results by topic (below). The first component 
was similar to our “high impact” list tests in other states we examined, checking a collection of URLs with 
content on or domain names including sensitive topics (for example, a page with Falun Gong material, or 
a URL such as www.falungong.com).  The second testing phase built on our past data on filtering in China 
by checking a set of domains known to be of concern.  Additionally, we tested URLs containing words or 
strings of letters similar to those found in pages on blocked topics (for example, testing URLs containing 
the strings “falu” or “flg” to probe filtering of Falun Gong content), but that hosted pages with content 
unrelated to the sensitive subject.  Finally, we tested a “long list” comprised of the top Google search 
results, in English and in Chinese, for keywords known to be sensitive and filtered.153 
 
D. Comparison of Testing Methods 
  Due to the complications of testing filtering in China, we sought to combine both proxy testing 
and in-state testing for this report.  We found a 78% correlation between the two methods, with almost all 
the sites we were able to access through the proxy also accessible in-state.  However, only 60% of the sites 
identified as blocked during proxy testing were confirmed as such during the in-state portion.  The 
discrepancies were concentrated in the sites tested to determine overblocking (filtering of URLs similar to 
those containing targeted content, but with unrelated subject matter):  82% of the blocks during proxy 
testing of sites sensitive content were confirmed during in-state testing and only 22% of the 
corresponding blocks of unrelated content were thus verified.  Potential explanations include the difficulty 
                       
152 See 404 error, Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/404_error. 
153 ONI compiled these keywords from a list of terms blocked by the instant messaging software QQ.  See The Words 
You Never See in Chinese Cyberspace, China Digital News, at 
http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/chinadn/en/archives/002885.html#more (Aug. 30, 2004). Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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of separating technical difficulties from intentional action, the limited scope of both tests (five proxies, 
one in-state run), and the dynamic nature of filtering in China (filtering methods may have changed 
during our testing).   
Figure 2 - Testing Method Consistency 
 
Overall   In-State Match  In-State Opposite  Consistency 
Blocked in Proxy Testing  38  25  60% 
Accessible in Proxy Testing 59  2  97% 
TOTALS 97  27  78% 
 
E. Topics Tested 
Because of the technical challenges of testing in China, including the TCP connection termination 
and “ZeroWindow” condition described below, we performed limited testing in the state.  Our testing 
focused on subjects known to be sensitive to China.  These include political subjects, such as Tibetan 
independence, Taiwanese independence, and the Tiananmen Square incident of June 4, 1989; religious 
subjects, such as the banned Falun Gong / Falun Dafa movement and the Dalai Lama; and broad subjects 
of concern, such as human rights in China, general political opposition, anti-Communist material, and 
general news. 
 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
A. Summary 
Our results demonstrate that China’s blocking of sensitive content – such as that related to the 
banned Falun Gong spiritual movement, Tibetan independence, or Taiwan – is extensive.  We 
documented instances of overblocking, where sites with superficial similarities to those with sensitive 
material, but different content, were filtered.  This likely indicates China’s willingness to tolerate blocking 
unrelated content to prevent access to sensitive materials.  The state’s filtering is not perfect – we were 
able to circumvent keyword detection for blog posts, and to obtain some filtered material at alternative 
locations – but it is nonetheless quite thorough.  China’s filtering regime is one of the most sophisticated 
in its ability to detect and prevent access to content that the state considers prohibited. 
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B. Proxy Testing Results 
 
1. Falun Gong 
Every site we tested related to the Falun Gong movement was blocked in both of our tests.   
 
Figure 3 - Falun Gong Sites 
 
Sites Tested  In-State Result  Proxy Result   
http://www.faluncanada.net/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.falundafa.org/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.faluninfo.net/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.fofg.org/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.faluninfo.net/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.stanford.edu/group/falun/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/bth/falun.htm Blocked  Blocked  
Total (7 sites)  100%  100%   
 
2. News 
Our news testing focused on sites that China has blocked previously, including Epoch Times, 
Boxun (also known as Peacehall), the Voice of America service, and the BBC.  Our results confirm that 
China filters these news sources, at a number of different URLs.  The in-state and proxy tests returned 
different results with regards to the two sites hosted within China itself.  Further research is necessary to 
determine the extent to which these sites make available content China otherwise attempts to filter.       
 
Figure 4 - News Sites 
 
Sites Tested   In-State Result  Proxy Result 
http://www.boxun.com.cn/ Accessible  Blocked 
http://www.voanews.95.cn/ Accessible  Blocked 
http://www.epochtimes.com/ Blocked  Blocked 
http://www.peacehall.com/ Blocked  Blocked 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Blocked  Blocked 
http://www.voa.gov/ Blocked  Blocked 
http://www.voanews.com/ Blocked  Blocked 
Total (7 sites)  71%  100% 
 
3. Political Topics 
In this category, we checked sites containing anti-Communist content, pages with material related 
to the Tiananmen Square incident, the site for the non-governmental organization Human Rights in Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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China, and various pro-democracy Web sites.  We found extensive blocking in all categories, including 
anti-Communist sites focused on China.  However, we were able to access a CNN site on the Tiananmen 
Square incident and a site calling for the American boycott of Chinese-made goods.  The majority of sites 
within this category were tested via proxy only; see above for a comparison of proxy and in-state results. 
 
Figure 5 - Political Sites 
 
Sites Tested  
In-State 
Result 
Proxy 
Result  Category 
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/tiananmen/ Accessible  Accessible  Tiananmen 
http://www.hrichina.org/ Blocked  Blocked  Human  Rights 
http://www.tsquare.tv/ Blocked  Blocked  Tiananmen 
http://www.fillthesquare.org/ Blocked  Blocked  Tiananmen 
http://www.64memo.com/ Blocked  N/A  Tiananmen 
http://www.spacepub.com/users/china/ N/A  Accessible  Boycott 
http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/50s/ 
theoharis.html N/A 
Blocked 
Anti-Communist 
http://www.schwarzreport.org/  N/A Blocked  Anti-Communist 
http://www.niagara.com/~freedom/anticom/first.htm N/A  Blocked  Anti-Communist 
http://www.informationblast.com/Anti-communism.html N/A  Blocked  Anti-Communist 
http://www.fact-index.com/a/an/anti_communism.html N/A  Blocked  Anti-Communist 
http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/ 
mccarthy.htm N/A 
Blocked 
Anti-Communist 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ 
americananticommunists/  N/A 
Blocked 
Anti-Communist 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-communism N/A  Blocked  Anti-Communist 
http://newstrolls.com/news/dev/guest/010899-2.htm N/A  Blocked  Opposition 
http://www.svdc.org/Main.html N/A  Blocked  Pro-democracy 
http://www.innermongolia.org/ N/A  Blocked  Pro-democracy 
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7288/ N/A  Blocked  Pro-democracy 
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6901/index.html N/A  Blocked  Pro-democracy 
http://www.freechina.net/pfdc/ N/A  Blocked  Pro-democracy 
Total (20 sites)  80%  89%  
 
4. Taiwan 
We tested sites containing general information on Taiwan as well as those advocating 
independence from China.  While our proxy testing found an extremely high level of blocking, in-state 
testing revealed a more moderate picture, with half of the tested sites blocked.  The home page of the 
Taiwanese government was found blocked in both tests, as was the page of an organization committed to Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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independence from China.  The Taipei Times was not blocked in either test, although the proxy we tested 
was unable to reach its content through a different site.   
 
Figure 6 - Taiwan Sites 
 
Sites Tested  
In-State 
Result 
Proxy 
Result 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/ Accessible Accessible 
http://www.theworldpress.com/press/worldpress/ 
taiwanpress/taipeitimes.htm 
Accessible Blocked 
http://www.roc-taiwan.org/ Accessible  N/A 
http://www.gov.tw/ Blocked  Blocked 
http://www.taiwan.com/ Blocked  Blocked 
http://www.taiwanindependence.com/ Blocked  Blocked 
http://anti-china.net/ N/A  Blocked 
http://cti.formosa.org/ N/A  Blocked 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_independence N/A  Blocked 
http://members.aol.com/JoJoLewis/Taiwan/Taiwan_index.html N/A  Blocked 
http://taiwansecurity.org/ N/A  Blocked 
http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9845.htm N/A  Blocked 
http://www.taiwanese.com/protest/ N/A  Blocked 
http://www.wufi.org.tw/eng/chnamyth.htm N/A  Blocked 
Total (14 sites)  50%  92% 
 
5. Tibet 
China blocked significant amounts of content in this category, including both material concerning 
the dispute over Tibet and sites about the Dalai Lama himself.  Again, our proxy testing found more 
comprehensive blocking; in-state testing found www.tibet.com, the official home page of Tibet’s 
government in exile, available.  Although the other accessible sites, one about the Dalai Lama’s 2005 trip 
to Belgium and one based on an extensive 1996 interview, may have proved difficult for China to locate 
and subsequently block, the same can hardly be true for www.tibet.com.  Its accessibility suggests an 
inconsistency in the operation of China’s filtering; further in-state data will hopefully clarify this picture. 
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Figure 7 - Tibet Sites 
 
Sites Tested   In-State Result  Proxy Result   
http://www.dalailama-belgium2005.org/ Accessible Accessible   
http://www.gluckman.com/DalaiLama.html Accessible Accessible   
http://www.tibet.com/  Accessible Blocked   
http://worldbridges.com/Tibet/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.dalailama.com/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.freetibet.org/ Blocked  Blocked   
http://www.boycottmadeinchina.org/ N/A  Blocked   
http://www.buyhard.fsnet.co.uk/boycottchinafortibet.htm N/A  Blocked   
http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/ N/A  Blocked   
http://www.tibet.ca/en/ N/A  Blocked   
http://www.tibetanliberation.org/ N/A  Blocked   
http://www.tibetjustice.org/index.html N/A  Blocked   
Total (12 sites)  50%  83%   
 
C. In-State Testing Results 
  To analyze the experience that a typical Chinese user has when attempting to access Internet 
content, ONI had several volunteers run its distributed testing application from different access points 
within the country.   
 
 1.  Summary 
  ONI’s enumeration of China’s filtering included two independent tests of 7929 URLs performed 
by volunteers at different access points within the country.  Unlike other countries in which ONI has 
tested filtering, China does not present users who attempt to access disapproved content with a “block 
page”; rather, users simply cannot access the material and often receive a general error message.  To 
identify instances where testers’ inability to access a page was likely caused by China’s filtering system, we 
defined sites as inaccessible due to blocking when two conditions were met: 
 
1.  Both of our testers were unable to reach the site, and 
2.  Both testers were, simultaneously, able to reach the site via a remote proxy server set up outside 
China for testing purposes. 
 
  The chart below summarizes our testing results. 
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Figure 8 - Summary of In-State Testing Results 
 
Status URLs  Percent 
Accessible Twice  5271  66% 
Accessible Once  699  9% 
Inaccessible Twice  1959  25% 
Total 7929  
 
  We treated URLs that were accessible once as accessible (not filtered) in our analysis. 
 
  To provide comparison, our testing included 813 Web sites found within the .cn top-level domain.  
We assumed that these sites, which are in a top-level domain controlled by China, would not be filtered 
and would generally be accessible within China.  The statistics for tested sites in .cn are below. 
 
Figure 9 – In-State Testing Results for .cn Web Sites 
 
Status URLs  Percent 
Accessible Twice  730  90% 
Accessible Once  83  10% 
Inaccessible Twice  -  - 
Total 813   
 
  These results support our definition of inaccessibility due to filtering; countries generally do not 
use technical means to filter content that is within their top-level domain, since they can exercise more 
direct forms of control over this material. 
 
 
 
  2. Long List Results 
  To explore further the accessibility of Web sites containing content potentially sensitive to China, 
we created a testing list (the “long list”) containing the top 100 sites returned by the Google search engine 
for queries on Chinese and English keywords related to sensitive topics, such as “Falun Gong.”  The charts 
below report the results of in-state testing of this long list, divided by topic area.  This data represents the 
percentage of the sites on the long list that testers could not access (we defined a site as inaccessible if it 
could not be reached in two or more test runs). 
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a. Falun Gong Sites 
  
Figure 10 - Falun Gong Google Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Our testing found a significant number of sites relating to the Falun Gong spiritual movement 
inaccessible.  Unlike in many other categories of content, a significant percentage of the English language 
sites were blocked, in both absolute terms and relative to Chinese language sites. 
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  b. General Political Content 
  
Figure 11 - Political Content Google Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  * We added “China” to the English term when conducting the Google search to focus the results. 
 
  These results demonstrate moderate inaccessibility of English and Chinese language sites for the 
general terms “democracy,” “human rights,” and “Jiang Zemin.”  We performed a search for a common 
variation of Jiang Zemin’s name used in criticism and satire by “replacing one of the characters of his 
name by the character for ‘thief’.”154  Tested Chinese language sites with this variation were almost 
completely inaccessible (we could not run this search in English since it depends on the similarity of the 
terms in Chinese).  Sites listed in response to a search for the “Nine Commentaries,” a highly critical 
evaluation of the Chinese Communist Party published by the Epoch Times, were also nearly totally 
                       
154 OpenNet Initiative, Filtering by Domestic Blog Providers in China, Jan. 14, 2005, available at 
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inaccessible.155  Interestingly, testers were able to access English language sites for this term significantly 
more often, due in part to a number of sites offering “nine commentaries” on other topics (such as the 
architect Frank Lloyd Wright).  This may also demonstrate lesser concern by China for English language 
material on the Nine Commentaries. 
 
  c. Opposition Political Parties 
 
Figure 12 - Opposition Political Party Google Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ** We tested multiple translations of this phrase, and used this particular search term because 
Google returned the greatest number of results in response to the query for it as compared to other 
variations. 
 
  Chinese language Web sites pertaining to opposition political parties were inaccessible during in-
state testing with extremely high frequency.  In some cases, such as URLs related to the Chinese Labor 
Party, sites were almost completely filtering during our testing.  We again found moderate to significant 
levels of inaccessibility for English language sites related to opposition parties. 
 
                       
155 See The Epoch Times, Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party, Dec. 1, 2004, available at 
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  d. Tiananmen Square 
  
Figure 13 - Tiananmen Square Google Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ONI’s testing found wide variation in whether sites on the Tiananmen Square incident could be 
accessed, depending on the search term used.  Chinese language sites related to searches for politically 
sensitive descriptions, such as “massacre” and “six four,” were virtually inaccessible during our testing; we 
found moderate levels of inaccessibility for English language sites pertaining to the search term 
“Tiananmen massacre” (we did not test the terms “six four” or “Tiananmen event” in English since they 
generated too many unrelated sites).  We found filtering of 70% of Chinese language sites related to a 
search for Zhao Ziyang, the former leader of China’s Communist Party who was removed from his post for 
opposing the repression of the Tiananmen demonstrations.  Surprisingly, URLs listed in response to a 
search for “Tiananmen Square” itself were only moderately inaccessible for both Chinese and English 
language sites. 
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 e.  Independence  Movements 
 
Figure 14 - Independence Movement Google Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ** We tested multiple translations of this term, with substantially similar results. 
 
  Sites on these topics were accessible more often than sites in other categories, though testers were 
not able to reach the majority of Chinese language sites concerning the Dalai Lama and Xinjiang 
independence.156  A relatively small percentage of Chinese language sites listed for searches for “Tibet” 
and “Taiwan” were inaccessible; the number rose significantly when the search query included the term 
“independence.”  Chinese language sites related to Tibet were slightly less accessible than sites discussing 
Taiwan; this gap was more pronounced for English language search results. 
 
                       
156 See generally Howard W. French, China Moves Toward Another West: Central Asia, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2004, 
at 1 (describing China’s concerns about the “threat of separatism by the region's Uighur minority, whose Turkik 
language and Islamic faith draw them toward kinsmen in Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics of the 
region”); see also You Ji, China’s post 9/11 terrorism strategy, Ass’n for Asian Research, May 11, 2004, at 
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 f.  Sex 
 
Figure 15 - Sex Google Results 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ** We tested multiple translations of this term, with substantially similar results. 
 
  We tested only Chinese language terms related to sex, and found minimal inaccessibility.  (Note 
that these results differ from those in our global list testing, described below, which found significant 
blocking of pornographic sites.) 
 
 g.  Homosexuality 
 
Figure 16- Homosexuality Google Results 
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  * We added “China” to the English search term when conducting the query to focus the search 
results. 
 
  Sites corresponding to both English and Chinese language search terms for this topic were only 
minimally inaccessible, although slightly more so than for general sex sites.  This low level of 
inaccessibility is generally consistent with the inadvertent “overblocking” of sites that is a common side 
effect of large-scale filtering efforts. 
 
  h. Longitudinal Comparison with 2002 Testing 
 
  To analyze changes in China’s filtering system over time, we compared our in-country results for 
sites related to a number of search terms in 2005 with results from ONI’s testing in fall 2002.   Several 
interesting trends appear in the data. 
 
Figure 17 - Longitudinal Comparison - 2002 and 2005 
 
Proportion of Top 10 and Top 100 Google Search Results Inaccessible 
  March - April 2005    August - September 2002 
Term  Top 10 Sites  Top 100 Sites    Top 10 Sites  Top 100 Sites 
china blog  0%  5%   30%  11% 
democracy China  30%  23%   80%  42% 
dissident   10%  14%   60%  31% 
dissident china  50%  28%   80%  37% 
equality 0%  3%   100%  24% 
freedom china  20%  23%   60%  32% 
revolution 0%  5%   70%  21% 
Taiwan 10%  14%   70%  47% 
Tibet 60%  38%   100%  64% 
天安门事件 (Tiananmen Event)  30% 48%   0%  8% 
性病 (STDs)  0% 1%   60%  13% 
性病 中国 (STDs China)  0% 1%   0%  4% 
民主 (democracy)  30% 18%   40%  15% 
法轮功 (Falun Gong)  40% 44%   30%  15% 
 
  The clearest trend is that sites are, generally, more accessible in 2005 than in 2002.  Only sites 
related to the Chinese terms for “Falun Gong” and “Tiananmen Event” were consistently less accessible in 
2005.  We found what appears to be greater specificity and better targeting by China’s filtering system: 
the largest declines in inaccessibility were for sites related to relatively vague English language search 
terms, such as “revolution” and “equality.”  Similarly, sites returned in response to search engine queries 
for the keywords “Taiwan” and “Tibet” were substantially less inaccessible in 2005 than 2002.  One 
plausible explanation is that China has refined its filtering system in the intervening 3 years.  For Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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example, sites related to searches for the terms “Tibet independence” and “Taiwan independence” were 
three times as inaccessible as sites for “Tibet” and “Taiwan” alone.  This suggests that China has tuned its 
filters to allow access to more neutral content on these general topics while preventing access to more 
politically sensitive material. 
 
  3. Global List Results 
 
Figure 18 - Global List Testing Results 
 
Category Sites 
Tested 
Percent 
Inaccessible 
Inaccessible Sites 
Alcohol 21  0%   
Anonymizers 20  5%  www.anonymizer.com 
Blogging Domains  19  5%  www.tblog.com 
Drugs 27  0%   
Email 20  10%  mail.yahoo.ca;  www.volcanomail.com 
Encryption 10  0%   
Entertainment 27  0%   
Famous Bloggers  23  13%  dear_raed.blogspot.com; oxblog.blogspot.com; 
atrios.blogspot.com 
Filtering Sites  9  11%  www.rsf.org 
Free Web Space  11  27%  www.150m.com; www.envy.nu; 
www.fortunecity.com 
Gambling 25  8%  www.allcraps.com;  www.poker.com 
Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual
/Transgender/Queer 
38 11%  www.al-fatiha.net;  www.amnestyusa.org/outfront; 
www.gayegypt.com; www.lgbt.com 
Government 56  5%  www.misrnet.idsc.gov.eg; www.president.gov.tw; 
www.tibet.com 
Groups (including 
usenet) 
17 6%  groups.google.com 
Hacking 22  5%  www.cultdeadcow.com 
Hate Speech  24  13%  www.aryannations.org; www.nsm88.com; 
www.resistance-radio.com 
Human Rights  27  7%  www.amnesty.org; www.rsf.org 
Humor 19  0%   
Major Events  29  14%  www.falundafa.org; www.passionofthepresent.org; 
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Misc 11  0%   
News Outlets  35  6%  news.bbc.co.uk; www.chinatimes.com.tw 
Porn 38  39%  [various] 
Provocative Attire  17  6%  www.abcunderwear.com 
Religion (fanatical)  9  0%   
Religion (normal)  51  2%  www.nobeliefs.com 
Search Engines  27  7%  www.afghana.com; www.yahooligans.com 
Sex Ed  26  8%  www.kidstalkaids.org; www.premaritalsex.info 
Translation Sites  13  0%   
Universities 33  0%   
Weapons/Violence 28  4%  www.guncite.com 
Women's Rights  29  7%  www.ifeminists.com; www.womenofarabia.com 
 
  The results from ONI’s in-country testing of our global list contain several interesting findings. 
First, the anonymizer sites that allow users to circumvent filtering were almost fully accessible in China.  
This is in sharp contrast to the practice of most countries with sophisticated filtering regimes, who 
aggressively block these sites. 
  Second, three popular free Web hosting domains are inaccessible, along with groups.google.com.  
This suggests that China is willing to block all content in these domains – even unrelated, inoffensive 
material -- and not simply content targeted by the state as prohibited.  The inaccessibility of the three 
blogs hosted on blogspot.com suggests a similar approach to blogs: tolerating broad overblocking to 
control sensitive content.   
  Third, pornography is inaccessible at a relatively high rate.157  This result contrasts with the low 
inaccessibility rate for sites returned from a Chinese language search for the term “pornography,” as 
described above.   
  Fourth, our testing revealed a significant number of sites that are inaccessible despite the 
availability of similar content at other Web pages (for example, see the sites that are blocked and available 
in the global list’s “weapons/violence” and “religion(normal)” categories).  Some of the inaccessible sites 
are those known to be targeted specifically by China’s filtering, such as news.bbc.co.uk, www.amnesty.org, 
and sites relating to Taiwan and Tibet.  Many others, though, appear unrelated to China’s filtering goals as 
we understand them.  It is not currently clear whether this mix of available and inaccessible sites with 
                       
157 China has sought to crack down on Internet pornography recently.  See, e.g., China moves against Internet porn, 
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similar content indicates a limited degree of concern for material in these subject areas, or whether the 
inaccessible sites are simply an unintended by-product of China’s filtering techniques. 
  Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, the majority of sites in the global list’s “anonymizers,” 
“human rights,” and “news” sites were accessible during our testing.  This finding contradicts the 
conventional wisdom about China’s blocking practices, and lends support for our conclusion that China’s 
filtering has become more finely targeted over time. 
 
  4. Domain-specific Blocking 
  Our in-state testing of the long list included multiple URLs in the same domain – for example, 
http://www.gluckman.com/DalaiLama.html and http://www.gluckman.com/Tianan.html.  Filtering is 
often done at the domain level; thus, our previous studies generally find binary results: a domain is either 
completely accessible or completely inaccessible (with the frequent exception of domains that host a wide 
variety of content by different authors, such as free web hosts or blogging domains).  Domains with a 
mixture of accessible and inaccessible URLs can help us understand the technical means employed to 
filter and can offer more detail on what content is targeted for filtering. 
  From a technical perspective, different results for sites in a single domain can result from either 
an inconsistent filtering system that does not subject all Web site requests to the same standards or the 
targeting of very specific content.  Our results do not yet allow us to answer definitively which of these 
answers applies in the case of China. 
 
  a. Partially and Completely Inaccessible Domains 
  We tested 2 or more URLs for 1091 domains; our in-country testers could not access at least one 
URL in 297 of these domains (27%).  Of these 297, all URLs tested were inaccessible in 278 domains 
(94%), and 19 (6%) had both accessible and inaccessible URLs.  Since the URLs we tested resulted from 
searches on keywords identified as potentially sensitive to the Chinese state, it is possible that other, 
untested URLs within these domains with non-sensitive content would have been available. 
  
  i. Heavily Tested Domains 
  The following domains had over 20 URLs tested, all of which were inaccessible in our testing. 
 
Figure 19 - Heavily Tested Domains With No Accessible URLs 
 
Domain Inaccessible 
URLs 
http://news.bbc.co.uk 81 
http://www.geocities.com 55 
http://www.epochtimes.com 46 
http://www.boxun.com 44 
http://www.peacehall.com 37 
http://www.voanews.com 29 
http://www.rfa.org 28 
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http://www.freechina.net 21 
http://xinsheng.net 20 
 
  ii. Selected Other Domains 
  These domains also had entirely inaccessible URLs in our testing. 
 
Figure 20 - Selected Domains With No Accessible URLs 
 
Domain Inaccessible  URLs 
http://web.amnesty.org 5 
http://www.amnesty.org 4 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk 3 
http://members.tripod.com 13 
http://members.lycos.co.uk 10 
http://www.angelfire.com 8 
http://hk.geocities.com 5 
http://www.salon.com 4 
http://[blogname].blogspot.com 13 
 
  iii. Selected Partially Accessible Domains 
 
Figure 21 - Selected Domains With Some Accessible and Some Inaccessible URLs158 
 
Domain  Inaccessible URLs  Accessible URLs 
http://members.aol.com 4  8 
http://www.fofg.org 3  7 
http://edition.cnn.com 4  6 
http://taiwansecurity.org 2  6 
http://www.asiaweek.com 1  6 
http://www.cnn.com 16  2 
http://www.time.com 10  1 
http://www.yale.edu 3  1 
http://www.gluckman.com 2  1 
 
  The cause for the mixed results in these domains is not always evident.  Some results are easily 
explained: the accessible URL in the www.yale.edu domain was Yale University’s home page, while the 
inaccessible URLs were related to the Falun Dafa (Falun Gong) movement, or to relations between China 
and Taiwan.  However, there appears to be little semantic difference between accessible and inaccessible 
content in the www.fofg.org or edition.cnn.com domains.  In addition, while most inaccessible URLs in 
the members.aol.com previously hosted content on the Inner Mongolian People’s Party, an opposition 
political movement, there were inconsistent results for two different URLs leading to the same content: 
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the URL http://members.aol.com/imppsite/ was accessible, while another URL resolving to the same 
page, http://members.aol.com/imppsite/index.htm, was not.   
 
  b. Free Web Hosting and Blogging Domains 
  Our results suggest that China frequently responds to the possibility that certain domains may 
contain a mix of targeted and unrelated content by rendering the entire domain inaccessible.  Our in-
country testing data provides numerous examples of this approach, including the domains 
www.geocities.com, www.angelfire.com, members.tripod.com, and the blogspot.com domains.  Since 
these domains resulted from searches for keywords on subjects likely to be of concern to the Chinese 
state, these results may overstate the extent of domain-wide filtering.  However, our testing of clearly non-
sensitive content in the www.geocities.com domain (including puppetry and juggling sites) supports our 
conclusion about domain-level blocking.  Additionally, 3 of the inaccessible blogspot.com URLs were 
derived from our global list, and thus were unlikely to contain material to which the Chinese state is 
particularly sensitive.  ONI found independent reports that www.geocities.com and blogspot.com were 
previously reported as entirely inaccessible by Chinese users, strengthening our analysis here.159 
 
                       
159 See Paul Baranowski, Blogspot Now Blocked From China, Jan. 10, 2005, at http://www.peek-a-
booty.org/pbhtml/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=56; Benjamin Edelman, Blocked sites will return, but 
with limited access, South China Morning Press, Jan. 26, 2003, available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/scmp-012603/. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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D. Overblocking 
  As a component of our in-state and proxy testing, we sought to locate sites whose Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL)160 contained strings indicative of content generally targeted by China, yet whose 
actual content was unrelated to these topics.  Our proxy testing located a high degree of such 
overblocking; the in-state testing located far less, but still contained several examples of sites blocked 
despite the lack of any material potentially offensive to China. 
 
1. Falun Gong 
  URLs tested here included either of the strings “falu” or “flg.”  Proxy testing found 60% of these 
sites blocked, although in-state testing found none. 
 
Figure 22 – Falun Gong Overblocking 
 
Sites Tested  
In-State 
Result 
Proxy 
Result Description 
http://www.redsalta.com/folclore/falu.htm Accessible  Blocked  Eduardo  Falu 
http://www.pitcher.no/FLG.html 
Accessible  Blocked  Computer utility (File List 
Generator) 
http://www.falu.com/ 
Accessible  Blocked  Manufacturer of machines 
to make cotton swabs 
http://www.flg.com/ 
Accessible Accessible  Cargo transporting 
company 
http://www.multimediapalace.com/ 
flg-wf.htm 
Accessible Accessible 
World animated flags 
Total (5 sites)  0%  60%   
 
                       
160 See World Wide Web Consortium, Web Naming and Addressing Overview (URIs, URLs, …), available at 
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  2. News 
  We tested URLs containing the strings “bbc”, “voa”, “voanews”, “epoch”, and “peacehall.”  Proxy 
testing found a majority of such sites blocked; in-state testing found a more limited set.  Neither method 
included any blocks on URLs containing “epoch,” but both found two of two URLS containing 
“voanews.com” blocked, although URLs containing only “voa” or “voanews” received mixed results. 
 
Figure 23 – News Overblocking 
 
Sites Tested   In-State Result  Proxy Result  Description 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
Accessible  Accessible  Home Page for BBC 
Network, UK 
http://www.deckyard.com/epoch.htm  Accessible Accessible  Deck repair 
http://www.epoch-net.org/ 
Accessible Accessible  Excellence  in 
Processing Open 
Cultural Heritage 
http://www.fortnet.org/VOA/ 
Accessible Accessible Volunteers  of 
America, Colorado 
http://www.scifi.com/onair/ 
scifipictures/epoch/ 
Accessible Accessible 
Science Fiction film 
http://www.bloggerheads.com/bbc/ 
Accessible Blocked  Supporting  BBC 
after the Hutton 
Report 
http://www.peacehall.org/ 
Accessible Blocked  The Peasall Sisters 
Bluegrass Band 
http://www.penkridge.org.uk/peaceh
all.htm 
Accessible  Blocked  Village hall in 
Penkridge, UK 
http://www.robbooth.net/2003/07/v
oanews.shtml 
Accessible  Blocked  Blog with link to 
VOA Story 
http://www.voa-gny.org/ 
Accessible Blocked  Volunteers  of 
America, Greater 
New York 
http://massbird.org/bbc/ 
Accessible 
N/A 
Brookline, MA bird 
club 
http://public.planetmirror.com/pub/
abit/download/drivers_update/voane
ws.com/ 
Blocked Blocked  Driver  download; 
no substantive 
content 
http://www.poets4peace.com/peaceh
all.htm 
Blocked  Blocked  "Hall of Peace" at 
Poets4Peace.com 
http://www.stumbleupon.com/url/w
ww.voanews.com/ 
Blocked  Blocked  Reviews of the VOA 
News page 
http://www.lnx-bbc.org/  Blocked  N/A Linux  distribution 
Total (15 sites)  27%  62%    
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  3. Political Topics 
  Our results show minimal overblocking in this category; one of three sites tested containing the 
string “64” (corresponding to the June 4th date of Tiananmen Square) was blocked in proxy testing but 
not in-state, and neither of the URLs we tested containing “hric” (the acronym for Human Rights in 
China) was blocked in either method. 
 
Figure 24 - Political Topic Overblocking 
 
Sites Tested 
In-State 
Result 
Proxy 
Result  Description 
http://www.ai-cit.sk/people/PhD/hric/  Accessible  N/A  Marcel Hric, PhD student 
http://www.neural.it/nnews/sixfour.htm  Accessible  N/A Italian  hactivism 
http://www.x86-64.org/  Accessible  Blocked Open  Source  software 
http://www.hric.org/ 
Accessible Accessible  Human  Resources 
Independent Consultants 
http://www.centre-square.com/ 
Accessible  Accessible  Theater in Ontario, 
Canada 
http://www.hr.duke.edu/hric/  Accessible Accessible  Duke Human Resources 
http://www.hoobly.com/members/tsquare/  Accessible Accessible  Classified Ads 
http://www.bartleby.com/64/ 
Accessible Accessible  English-language 
reference 
http://www.macminute.com/2004/12/23/ 
64-bit/ 
Accessible 
Accessible Computer  development 
Total (9 sites)  0%  14%   
  
4. Taiwan 
  Similar to the above categories, we found evidence of overblocking only in our proxy testing. 
 
Figure 25 - Taiwan Overblocking 
 
Sites Tested 
In-State 
Result 
Proxy 
Result Description 
http://english.people.com.cn/data/province/ 
taiwan.html 
Accessible Blocked  Chinese  government 
site on "Taiwan 
Province" 
http://www.askaroo.com/info/ 
Taiwanindependence.html 
Accessible  Blocked  Page lacks any 
substantive content 
http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/ 
north_east_asia/taipei/ 
Accessible 
Accessible  Travel guide to Taipei 
Total (3 sites)  0%  67%   
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 5.  Tibet 
  We tested several URLs containing the strings “tibet” or “dalai”.  All were blocked in proxy 
testing; only a Swiss travel guide was blocked during in-state testing. 
 
Figure 26 - Tibet Overblocking 
 
Sites Tested 
In-State 
Result 
Proxy 
Result Description 
http://www.tibet.cn/  Accessible Blocked  China Tibet information center 
http://www.dalai.com/  Accessible Blocked  Dalai software, Mexico 
http://www.pmgeiser.ch/tibet/ Blocked Blocked  Tibet travel guide 
Total (3 sites)  33%  100%   
 
E. Mechanics of China’s Filtering 
Our results elucidate several interesting characteristics of how the underlying filtering 
infrastructure in China operates. 
 
1. Underinclusive IP Address Blocking 
For a subset of the sites we tested, we also attempted to reach the site at its IP address.  To 
prevent access to a site completely, a filtering regime cannot block only its URL, but must also filter its IP 
address.  We tested both the URL and the IP address during in-state testing for 29 sites; in 24 cases, the 
result was consistent (both were either blocked or accessible).  Four sites (www.fofg.org, 
www.freetibet.org, www.tibet.com, and www.lnx-bbc.org) could not be reached at their URLs, but were 
accessible at their IP addresses.  We believe that the blocking of www.lnx-bbc.org is inadvertent, and thus 
it is not surprising that its IP address is accessible.  However, the other three sites clearly contain sensitive 
content, but are not filtered at their IP addresses.  Thus, while China blocks both IP addresses and URLs 
to ensure that sensitive sites are filtered, it does not do so consistently. 
 
2. URL vs. Domain-Level Filtering 
Our research indicates that filtering states generally block on a domain-by-domain basis; they 
prevent access to an entire domain rather than filtering individual Web pages and URLs.  The exceptions 
to this behavior tend to be domains containing large amounts of diverse, unrelated content, such as the 
free Web hosting domain geocities.com or Yahoo!’s groups.161  Our in-state testing in China, however, 
found several instances where particular URLs were blocked but the domain was accessible, though the 
source (authorship) of content appeared consistent across the domain.  For example, the URL 
www.stanford.edu/group/falun was blocked, but www.stanford.edu was not.  The following sites were 
blocked while their top-level URLs were accessible: 
 
                       
161 In addition, commercial filtering software such as Secure Computing’s SmartFilter often assigns different pages 
within a domain to different categories; thus, some pages, but not the entire domain, are filtered when a filtering state 
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Figure 27 - Blocked Sites With Accessible Top-Level URLs 
 
www.stanford.edu/group/falun/ 
public.planetmirror.com/pub/abit/download/drivers_update/voanews.com/ 
www.stumbleupon.com/url/www.voanews.com/ 
www.let.leidenuniv.nl/bth/falun.htm 
 
This pattern may indicate filtering by URL string, blocking with no effort to investigate the nature 
of the content at a page, or an extremely aggressive attempt to locate and filter offensive content while 
preserving access to the bulk of the content of domains containing one or more site related to generally 
filtered content. 
 
F. E-mail Filtering 
  E-mail is a vital Internet communications tool; ONI conducted a brief series of tests to evaluate 
whether, and how, China filters messages with sensitive content.  Our results suggest that China does not 
filter e-mail messages at the backbone level of its network; instead, filtering is more likely to be performed 
by individual e-mail service providers, with little consistency among providers.162 
  Filtering technology for e-mail messages is well-developed due to the need to combat unsolicited 
bulk e-mail messages, commonly known as “spam.”  Spam filters are typically installed on e-mail servers; 
these filters search for specific patterns, keywords, or other characteristics of spam messages, such as 
altered message headers.  If the filter detects a message that matches its definition of spam, it will 
typically reject the e-mail message, quarantine it, or tag it as spam.  Many ISPs also block access to the IP 
addresses of mail servers associated with spammers.  
  To test China’s e-mail filtering, ONI acquired five e-mail accounts (addresses) from free e-mail 
service providers in China.  We created ten e-mail messages with sensitive content in the subject line and 
body text.163  We based the content of these messages on the monthly news summaries of significant 
events in China compiled by Human Rights In China (HRIC); these include information on arrests of 
political dissidents and religious persecution.  We sent each of these ten messages in English to all five e-
mail accounts in China from two different e-mail accounts hosted outside China. We also sent each of the 
messages in Chinese twice (once encoded in the GB 2312 character set and once in Unicode) to the five e-
mail accounts in China. 
  In our tests, none of the politically sensitive e-mail messages we sent in English were blocked 
consistently.  One of our e-mail accounts, with service provider 21cn.com, did not receive our first 
message containing information about the relatives of protesters injured at the Tiananmen Square 
protest, but 21cn.com did receive this message when we sent it from our second e-mail account.  We 
observed the same pattern for the message about surveillance in China we sent to two accounts with 
providers 163.com and 21cn.com. Finally, messages sent in English about media censorship and religious 
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persecution were received at our sina.com.cn account from our first sending account, but not from our 
second account.  Overall, when we analyzed results for the two sets of messages combined, every message 
with material on sensitive topics in English was received at all our e-mail accounts in China. 
  We tested the same messages in Chinese by sending two sets of these ten messages, encoded in 
different character sets.  (There are multiple character encoding settings used to display Chinese 
characters.  We sent messages encoded both in GB 2312, the official character set of the People's Republic 
of China, and in UTF-8 Unicode.)  Our results varied depending on the encoding of the message. 
  In our Unicode testing, we found that all the messages were received, except for six of ten 
messages sent to our account at sina.com.cn.  The six messages that we did not receive at our sina.com.cn 
account were those containing content on protests by Tiananmen mothers, media censorship, religious 
persecution, political dissidents, arrests and sentences, and petitions and protests.  (However, we did 
receive each of these messages at sina.com.cn when they were encoded in GB 2312.) 
  In our GB 2312 testing, we saw much lower success rates at receiving messages.  We did not 
receive three of the messages – those concerning the Tiananmen mothers, media censorship, and 
surveillance – at three or more of our five accounts.  In addition, the message concerning religious 
persecution was not received at our citiz.net e-mail account.   
  Overall, our results do not suggest consistent e-mail filtering in China.  None of our test messages 
containing sensitive content was blocked by all five e-mail service providers in China, indicating that 
filtering of e-mail traffic at the backbone level of the network either does not exist or is inconsistent.  
Instead, our results suggest that individual e-mail service providers may filter messages at the mail server 
level in a non-uniform fashion. 
 
G. Blog Filtering Testing 
Today, Chinese servers host an estimated 600,000 bloggers, who post content ranging from daily 
diaries to political commentary.164  Over the last year, China intensified efforts to control blogs’ content.  
In March 2004, the state closed three popular, domestic blog providers,165 reportedly because a blogger 
posted a controversial letter regarding the Tiananmen Square incident and the SARS outbreak.166 
Subsequently, all three providers were allowed to re-open, but implemented filtering mechanisms to 
control content posted to their blogs.  These systems search for sensitive keywords when users attempt to 
post material. 
In August 2004, Chinese hackers discovered a list of 987 sensitive keywords (in both Chinese and 
English) in a component of the popular QQ instant messaging.167  The software filters messages with these 
                       
164 Estimates of the total number of blogs in China vary; we used the number provided by CNBlog.org, at 
http://www.cnblog.org/index.html.   
165 These providers are blogcn.com, blogbus.com, and blogdriver.com. 
166 See Juliana Liu, China Shuts Down Two Internet “blog” Sites, Reuters, available at 
http://asia.news.yahoo.com/040318/3/1eig1.html (March 18, 2004); see also China Doctor Calls 1989 “Mistake,” BBC 
News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3542049.stm (March 8, 2004) (discussing the content of the letter 
criticizing China's response to the Tiananmen demonstrations). 
167 See The Words You Never See in Chinese Cyberspace, China Digital News. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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keywords; the hackers posted the cracked list to a Chinese Bulletin Board System.168  The list includes 
terms in categories that includes national minorities’ independence movements, the Tiananmen Square 
incident, Falun Gong, proper names of Chinese Communist Party leaders, and sensitive non-proper nouns 
(such as generic words relating to uprisings or oppression).  ONI used this list of keywords to test the blog 
filtering mechanism for each of the three providers.  We found that Blogbus and BlogCN filtered only 18 
and 19 keywords, respectively, while Blogdriver filtered 350 of the terms.  We discovered that, when 
triggered, the filtering software for BlogCN and Blogdriver prevented the user from completing the post 
and issued a pop-up alert.  Blogbus replaced sensitive keywords with “*” characters.  We also found that 
the controls were not fool-proof, and were able to bypass them by inserting characters, such as dashes, to 
split up sensitive keywords. 
The censorship of Web logs demonstrates that China pursues a multi-pronged campaign to 
regulate the Internet, not only by limiting access to established Web sites, but also by controlling what 
content Chinese authors can post online domestically.   
 
H. Google Cache Testing 
Google is one of the most popular search engines for users worldwide.  Google’s cache function, 
though, allows users to access (at least intermittently) filtered content, because the request for that 
material goes to Google’s servers, not to the blocked source’s servers.169  Concerned by this circumvention 
method, China temporarily blocked access to Google in September 2002170; requests for Google’s site were 
redirected to Chinese search engines.171  According to the company, Google negotiated with Chinese 
officials, and eventually access was restored.172 
However, we found that while Google’s site is accessible to Chinese users,173 the Google cache174 
and certain keyword searches are blocked.  To test access to Google in China, we connected to 37 Google 
servers from 11 remote computers located on four different backbone networks in China, and also from a 
remote testing facility.  We found that the filtering mechanism blocking Google’s cache is triggered by the 
text string “search?q=cache” in the HTTP GET request; this occurs whether the request is sent to a Google 
server or to a different site’s server.  A user making such a keyword request – seeking to access a site’s 
cache – experiences disrupted access to the site.175   
                       
168 This list is archived at http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/008/bbs.pdf. 
169 See, e.g., Gutmann, Losing the New China at 164-65. 
170 China Blocking Google, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2231101.stm (Sept. 2, 2002). 
171 Berkman Center for Intenet & Society, Replacement of Google with Alternative Search Systems in China: 
Documentation and Screen Shots, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/google-replacements/ (Sept. 24, 
2002). 
172 See Jay Lyman, Google Responds to China Ban, NewsFactor Technology News, at 
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/19279.html (Sept. 3, 2002); see also Tim Richardson, Google China Crisis 
Over, The Register, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/09/12/google_china_crisis_over/ (Sept. 12, 2002). 
173 See the enumeration report documenting our test results at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/googleservers.html. 
174 See the enumeration report documenting our test results at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/googlecacheservers.html. 
175 See OpenNet Initiative, Probing Chinese Search Engine Filtering, at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/005/index.html#filtering (Aug. 19, 2004). Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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However, the filtering system can be bypassed – inserting an ampersand (&) into the HPPT GET 
request, such as “search?&q=cache”, allowed access to Google’s cache.176  We could not access Web sites 
with sensitive keywords, such as “falun,” in their URLs.  The filtering mechanism appears specifically 
designed to target Google’s cache, since caches of other popular search engines, such as Yahoo!, worked 
properly.177  
Although China no longer blocks Google entirely, a Chinese user will have a very different 
experience when using the search engine for some queries due to the state’s filtering practices.  Accessing 
Google’s cache is a well-known method of ad-hoc circumvention of Internet censorship, and China’s 
filtering mechanism seems designed specifically to close this loophole. 
 
I. Filtering by Chinese Search Engines Baidu and Yisou 
In July 2004, Reporters Sans Frontières admonished Google and Yahoo! as complicit in China’s 
filtering practices based on the companies’ holdings in two domestic Chinese search engines, Baidu.com 
and Yisou.com.178  We researched RSF’s claims and confirmed that Baidu and Yisou filter by keyword and 
remove certain search results from their lists, but found that some keyword searches were blocked by 
China’s gateway filtering and not the search engines themselves. 
We searched Baidu and Yisou for various sensitive keywords, such as “free Tibet” and “falun.”  By 
refining our searches to look specifically within URLs as well as for page content, we concluded that the 
search engines index sensitive sites, but do not list them among search results.  We posit that the search 
engine “crawlers” that compile results may be able to index content despite China’s filtering — perhaps by 
operating from a remote location outside China — since the crawlers did index some sensitive sites. We 
also found that some cached versions of sensitive sites were sporadically available, leading us to conclude 
that filtering occurs “upstream,” at the Internet infrastructure level.     
Interestingly, our Baidu and Yisou testing provided important insight into the mechanics of 
China’s Web filtering.  When a user requests a banned keyword, the filtering system terminates that user’s 
connection to the destination server by sending a TCP RST (reset) packet to the user, followed by 
advertising a TCP ZeroWindow size.179  This technique uses TCP’s flow control feature to prevent the 
user’s computer from transmitting additional data to the destination server (such as the Baidu.com search 
engine).  This disconnection persisted for prolonged periods despite multiple attempts to reconnect. 
We confirmed partially Reporters Sans Frontières’ claims that the search engines Baidu and 
Yisou, with which Google and Yahoo! have investment relationships, filter the Web content they return 
when users search for certain sensitive keywords.  However, this is only part of a set of complex, 
                       
176 See the enumeration report documenting our test results at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/googlecacheservers-mod.html. 
177 See the enumeration report documenting our test results at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/othersearchengines.html. 
178 Reporters Sans Frontières, Google – Yahoo Market Battle Threatens Freedom of Expression, at 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11031 (July 26, 2004). 
179 See OpenNet Initiative, Probing Chinese Search Engine Filtering, at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/005/#res (Aug. 19, 2004); see generally Von Welch, A User’s Guide to TCP 
Windows, at http://www.ncsa.uiuc.edu/People/vwelch/net_perf/tcp_windows.html (last updated June 19, 1996). Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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overlapping filtering practices that include filtering in China’s broader Internet infrastructure.  Thus, we 
caution that any claims about filtering must incorporate analysis of the serious technical complexities of 
China’s filtering regime.  
 
J. Restrictions on University On-Line Bulletin Board Systems 
China recently moved to impose stricter controls on the discussions taking place on university 
bulletin board systems (BBS).   These message boards, some of which claimed hundreds of thousands of 
users,180 were immensely popular with students and with non-students users.  As one of the few outlets 
for open, anonymous speech in China, the boards functioned as “virtual communities,” serving as 
alternatives to state-run media181 or as dissemination points for critiques of the Communist Party.182  The 
boards also hosted tools to circumvent China’s Internet censorship as well as discussions on sensitive 
topics like Tibet and Taiwan.183 
As part of a Chinese Communist Party campaign to exercise tighter control over culture, 
education, and media, China’s Education Ministry ordered the universities to censor the BBS.184  Its order 
stated that “[h]armful information should be detected and deleted… [message boards] on which harmful 
information has been spread should be shut down.”185  In justifying the government’s reasoning, one 
official explained that “[t]he message boards are too diverse, and students who read them are prone to 
rumor mongering…. Students don’t watch TV or listen to radio but go to BBS and believe what they read.  
Many students with a right view do not speak on the BBS.”186 
The new restrictions limit BBS use to current students, cutting off access to all other users, 
including former students living abroad. 187  This is a significant limitation on the BBS’ reach -- one 
current student estimated that as many as half of the users on his university’s message board system were 
non-students.188  The new regulations also require registration tied to the user’s identity, eliminating the 
cherished anonymity the boards used to provide.189  These actions will undoubtedly curtail discussion and 
speech on the BBS.  As one frustrated student lamented, “When we use our real names we are lying; when 
we use false names, we speak the truth.”190 The BBS crackdown provides a microcosm of China’s Internet 
content filtering: when the state detects exchange of information on sensitive topics, it employs both legal 
and technical methods to curtail, and ultimately silence, this speech. 
                       
180 Robert Marquand, Beijing Enforces the Party Line, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0406/p01s04-woap.html 
181 Marquand, Beijing Enforces the Party Line. 
182 Philip P. Pan, Chinese Crack Down on Student Web Sites, Washington Post, Mar. 23, 2005, at A13 
183 Benjamen Walker, Theory of Everything: Freedom on the March (radio broadcast, Apr. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.toeradio.org/archives/2005/04/broadcast_18_fr.html. 
184 Marquand, Beijing Enforces the Party Line; Pan, Chinese Crack Down on Student Web Sites. 
185 Marquand, Beijing Enforces the Party Line. 
186 Marquand, Beijing Enforces the Party Line. 
187 Marquand, Beijing Enforces the Party Line. 
188 Walker, Theory of Everything: Freedom on the March. 
189 Pan, Chinese Crack Down on Student Web Sites. 
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K. Restrictions on On-Line Discussion Forums 
  On-line chats are extremely popular in China; a spokesperson for the site sina.com.cn told 
Reporters Sans Frontières that 4 million users employ its forums each day.191  A study by Reporters Sans 
Frontières (RSF) of censorship in these on-line discussion forums found that postings were filtered 
heavily, but inconsistently, and that users who persist in adding content on sensitive topics face exclusion 
from these services and, in extreme cases, even imprisonment.192     
  The RSF study found evidence of a complicated, and sometimes inconsistent, filtering regime for 
online discussion forums.  The study states that most sites temporarily block all postings containing 
certain forbidden terms, but that forum Webmasters can override the automatic filter if, on review, the 
views expressed are deemed acceptable.  (Such reviews are evidently uncommon since Webmasters spend 
most of their time monitoring forums for forbidden content, not attempting to restore improperly blocked 
posts.)  Webmasters also manually remove messages with prohibited content that elude the automatic 
filters.  These Webmasters are generally unpaid volunteers who are supervised by forum administrators 
charged with ensuring that no unacceptable material appears online.   
  In RSF’s study, only 30% of messages containing “controversial content” were posted 
successfully.  While 55% of messages with controversial content made it into the forums initially, RSF 
found that more than half of these postings were removed by Webmasters.  The most controversial posts, 
containing “direct criticism or demands targeted at the central government,” either never appeared or 
were available only briefly.  More moderate messages, with content on sensitive political topics but 
without criticism of the state, were successfully posted over 70% of the time, though some were later taken 
down.  Almost 80% of messages containing only factual information on current topics made it into 
forums, except for xinhaunet.com, which filtered over half these posts. 
  As xinhaunet.com’s blocking demonstrates, the level of filtering varied by forum.  RSF found that, 
generally, “The most open Internet sites are the ones that are commercial enterprises.  Competition 
within this sector encourages those in charge to test the limits of censorship.”  Thus, forums at 163.net 
and sina.com have more lenient filtering.  In contrast, quasi-official sites, such as xinhuanet.com, 
censored postings critical of the government more stringently; RSF concluded that these “webmasters 
give priority to censoring messages that criticise the government.”  Criticism of China’s handling of the 
SARS crisis was particularly targeted for censorship. 
  Users who post unacceptable material face exclusion from forums.  The RSF researcher was 
eventually blocked from using her user ID at sina.com.cn; a Sina.com company spokesperson confirmed 
that such “blacklisting” occurs.  In extreme cases, penalties can be severe: RSF described four cases of 
online dissidents who were arrested for posting “harmful messages.” 
                       
191 Reporters Sans Frontières, “Living dangerously on the Net”: Censorship and surveillance of Internet forums, May 
12, 2003, at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6793. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
China makes a systematic, comprehensive, and frequently successful effort to limit the ability of 
its citizens to access and to post on-line content the state considers sensitive.  At the level of legal 
regulation, China has a complex, overlapping system of laws, regulations, and informal methods that 
attempts to prevent the creation and distribution of banned material.  At the technological level, the state 
employs a sophisticated infrastructure that filters content at multiple levels and that tolerates 
overblocking as the price of preventing access to prohibited sites.  Importantly, China’s filtering efforts 
lack transparency: the state does not generally admit to censoring Internet content, and concomitantly 
there is no list of banned sites and no ability for citizens to request reconsideration of blocking, as some 
other states that filter provide.  The topics defined as sensitive, or prohibited, by China’s legal code are 
broad and non-specific, and enforcement of laws such as the ban on spreading state secrets discourages 
citizens from testing the boundaries of these areas.  China’s legal and technological systems combine to 
form a broad, potent, and effective means of controlling the information that Chinese users can see and 
share on the Internet. 
Moreover, the research we have conducted over several years – both individually as institutions 
and collectively as the ONI – demonstrates increasing sophistication of China’s filtering regime.  Its 
filtering system has become at once more refined and comprehensive over time, building a matrix of 
controls that stifles access to information deemed illegitimate by authorities.  Considering that China’s 
growing Internet population represents nearly half of all Internet users worldwide, and will soon overtake 
the United States as the single largest national group of Internet users, such extensive censorship should 
be of concern to all Internet users worldwide.  China’s advanced filtering regime presents a model for 
other countries with similar interests in censorship to follow.  It has also shown a willingness to defend 
and even promote the principles of its filtering regime to international venues governing global 
communications, such as the World Summit of the Information Society.   While there can be legitimate 
debates about whether democratization and liberalization are taking place in China’s economy and 
government, there is no doubt that neither is taking place in China’s Internet environment today. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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APPENDIX 1 
China Background 
 
A. General Description 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is located in eastern Asia, between North Korea and 
Vietnam.  With a geographic area of approximately 3.7 million square miles and a population of 1.3 
billion, China is one of the largest and most populous areas on Earth.193  Officially atheist since 2002, 
China’s population includes adherents to Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity.  Describing itself as 
a “central democracy,” China exists as a socialist state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party.194 
Though it has the second-largest economy in the world, China still ranks low in per capita 
economic measures.  China has attempted to integrate market-oriented systems with a political 
framework of strict and centralized Communist control.195  China is ranked 94 out of 177 states in 2004 on 
the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index.196 
 
B. Political System 
The Chinese Communist Party controls the legislature, known as the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), which is composed of 2,989 delegates serving five-year terms.  The NPC appoints an executive 
State Council.197  While other political parties exist, none is recognized by China because they are 
considered subversive.198  The state is divided into 22 provinces, four municipalities directly under central 
government control, and five autonomous regions governed by local people’s congresses.199 
The Chinese Communist Party represses dissent, although traditional systems of social control 
and surveillance, such as the previously utilized “work unit”, are being discarded in favor of structural 
reforms, greater social mobility, and strong economic growth.200  Nonetheless, independent organizations 
capable of mobilizing popular support are perceived as threats; for example, the Chinese state has 
vigorously suppressed the practice of Falun Gong201 and the separatist views of those who support 
freedom for Tibet.202   
                       
193 China, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, at  http://search.eb.com/eb/article?tocId=9117321. 
194 CIA, The World Factbook -- China, Feb. 10, 2005, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html. 
195 See generally U.S. Department of State, Background Note: China, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm 
(Oct. 2004); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics 1-11 (1992 ed.). 
196 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2004 at 139-140, July 15, 2004, at 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/. 
197 CIA, The World Factbook – China. 
198 CIA, The World Factbook – China. 
199 CIA, The World Factbook – China. 
200 With work units, state-owned factories provided salary, housing, education, and political indoctrination.  See 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Briefings: China – Political Forces, at 
http://www.economist.com/countries/China/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DPolitical%20Forces (Feb. 9, 2004). 
201 See Falun Gong: China’s Dilemma, CNN.com, at http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2002/falungong/. 
202 See The Dalai Lama: Man of Peace Takes His Place on World Stage, CNN.com, at 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/inside.china/profiles/dalai.lama/. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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APPENDIX 2 
Entities Involved in Internet Regulation in China 
 
•  Central Propaganda Department 
•  Department of Commerce 
•  Department of Telecommunications 
•  General Administration of Press and Publications 
•  Ministry of Culture 
•  Ministry of Information Industry 
•  Ministry of Public Security 
•  Public Security Bureau 
•  State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television 
•  State Council 
•  State Council Information Agency 
•  State Secrets Bureau 
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APPENDIX 3 
In-Country Testing Results – Domains With Some Accessible and Some Inaccessible URLs 
 
URL Status 
http://members.aol.com/Sftrail/christ/comment/bible/ezra/ Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/Tibetan/Monitor3.html Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/yikhmongol/smff.htm Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/bblum6/mem.htm Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/casmasalc/ Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/imppsite/ Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/kurdis6065/Psk.html Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/TeacherNet/Industrial.html Accessible 
http://members.aol.com/imppsite/cnpage.htm Inaccessible 
http://members.aol.com/imppsite/dcl.htm Inaccessible 
http://members.aol.com/imppsite/index.htm Inaccessible 
http://members.aol.com/TeacherNet/Medieval.html Inaccessible 
http://www.fofg.org/act/act_join.php Accessible 
http://www.fofg.org/chinese/index.php Accessible 
http://www.fofg.org/news/news_category.php?cat_id=11 Accessible 
http://www.fofg.org/news/news_story.php?doc_id=679 Accessible 
http://www.fofg.org/voices/voices_story.php?doc_id=308 Accessible 
http://www.fofg.org/  Accessible 
http://www.fofg.org/chinese/persecution/persecution_bknd.php?cat_id=18 Accessible 
http://www.fofg.org/news/news_category.php?cat_id=28 Inaccessible 
http://www.fofg.org/news/news_story.php?doc_id=44 Inaccessible 
http://www.fofg.org/news/news_story.php?doc_id=875 Inaccessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/01/amnesty.tiananmen/ Accessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/10/29/profile.jiang.zemin/ Accessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/11/09/china.net/ Accessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/01/16/china.zhao/ Accessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/26/taiwan.china.dissident/ Accessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/08/china.gay/ Accessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/01/29/zhao.memorial/ Inaccessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2002/falungong/ Inaccessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/china.taiwan/ Inaccessible 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9905/28/china.democracy/ Inaccessible 
http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-991224-China-Democracy-Party.htm Accessible 
http://taiwansecurity.org/ST/2004/ST-150604.htm Accessible 
http://taiwansecurity.org/LAT/LAT-990604.htm Accessible 
http://taiwansecurity.org/  Accessible 
http://taiwansecurity.org/News/FEER-01272000-Village-Democracy.htm Accessible Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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http://taiwansecurity.org/News/FEER-990527.htm Accessible 
http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990602.htm Inaccessible 
http://taiwansecurity.org/TT/2005/TT-130105.htm Inaccessible 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/97/0502/nat7.html Accessible 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/features/power50.2001/p04.html Accessible 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/nations/0,8782,99515,00.html Accessible 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0216/nat6.html Accessible 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/daily/foc/0,8773,98300,00.html Accessible 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0614/nat4.html Accessible 
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/nations/0,8782,165866,00.html Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/23/china.falungong/ Accessible 
http://www.cnn.com/  Accessible 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/ASIANOW/east/01/11/falun.gong.factbox/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/12/09/bush.china.ap/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/03/china.rights.reut/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/03/17/china.humanrights/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/specials/9908/china.social.overview/content/religious.freedom.
html 
Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/50.beyond/democracy.zhao/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/inside.china/profiles/dalai.lama/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/inside.china/profiles/jiang.zemin/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/red.giant/prisons/wu.essay/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/china.summit/jiang.profile/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9706/04/tianamen.anniversary/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9706/04/tiananmen.hong.kong/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/world/9711/16/china.unrest/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9711/16/wei/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9806/25/china.democracy/ Inaccessible 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9806/25/wei.interview/ Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/lama1.html Accessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/falun_gong/ Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/heroes/zhao.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/xinjiang/cover.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/youngchina/s.gay.author.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/99/0927/democracy_wall.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501031124-543843,00.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/daily/0,9754,1018129,00.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/magazine/0,9754,165163,00.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/poy/zemin.html Inaccessible 
http://www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/profile/rebel.html Inaccessible 
http://www.yale.edu/  Accessible 
http://www.yale.edu/falun/Pages/dymf/dymf_4.htm Inaccessible Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005       
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http://www.yale.edu/falun/zfl-html/zfl_3a.htm Inaccessible 
http://www.yale.edu/yfp/archives/november04/november04_peace.htm Inaccessible 
http://www.gluckman.com/DalaiLama.html Accessible 
http://www.gluckman.com/FalunGong.html Inaccessible 
http://www.gluckman.com/Tianan.html Inaccessible 
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APPENDIX 4 
Results of E-mail Filtering Testing 
 
English Messages – First Test 
Provider Message 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
http://mail.163.com/ Y  Y  Y  N Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
http://mail.21cn.com/ Y n Y n Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
http://www.citiz.net/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
http://mail.sina.com.cn/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
http://mail.tom.com/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
              
Chinese Messages - GB 2312 Encoding 
Provider Message 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
http://mail.163.com/ Y  N Y N Y Y Y  Y  Y  Y 
http://mail.21cn.com/ Y n  n  n Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
http://www.citiz.net/ Y  Y  n Y n Y Y Y  Y Y 
http://mail.sina.com.cn/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
http://mail.tom.com/ Y  N  N  N  n  N Y  Y  Y  Y 
              
English Messages – Second Test 
Provider Message 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
http://mail.163.com/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
http://mail.21cn.com/ Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
http://www.citiz.net/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
http://mail.sina.com.cn/ Y  Y  n Y n Y Y Y  Y Y 
http://mail.tom.com/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
 
Chinese Messages – Unicode (UTF-8) Encoding 
Provider Message 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
http://mail.163.com/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
http://mail.21cn.com/ Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
http://www.citiz.net/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
http://mail.sina.com.cn/ Y  n  n Y n Y N  N  n Y 
http://mail.tom.com/ Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y Y Y Y 
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Legend 
Y = E-mail Message Received 
N = Email Message Not Received, Error Message Delivered to Sender 
n = E-mail Message Not Received, No Error Message Delivered to Sender 
 
Message 
Number 
Contents 
1  Death Penalty Data on China 
2  Tiananmen Mothers’ Criticism of Government’s Actions 
3  Media Censorship by China 
4 Police  Surveillance of Dissidents 
5  Religious Persecution of Falun Gong 
6  Deaths of Coal Miners in Underground Explosion 
7  Detention of Political Dissidents 
8  Arrest and Sentencing of Tibetan Monks 
9  Petitions and Protests by Political Activists on Human Rights 
10  Arrest of Writer for Advocating Uighur Independence  
 